Kinas sociala kontrakt håller på att spricka: "Fråga om tillit"

Kontraktet mellan det kinesiska styret och befolkningen har de senaste åren varit tydligt: ekonomiska möjligheter och ”välstånd åt alla”, i utbyte mot kraftiga begränsningar i den politiska friheten. Men med en tillväxt som inte tar fart som den ska och en inrikespolitik som skakat en rad sektorer i grundvalarna, har kontraktet blivit allt otydligare. Det skriver Financial Times. – I grund och botten är det en fråga om tillit, säger Kinaexperten George Magnus till tidningen. A once optimistic society now worries about the future as Xi Jinping’s promise of ‘common prosperity’ starts to fade By Sun Yu and Joe Leahy in Beijing

Financial Times, 2 November 2023 In Yuxinzhuang village, a warren of narrow streets on Beijing’s outskirts known for its vibrant community of migrant workers, Zhou wolfs down noodles in a tiny Muslim restaurant. The 30-year-old father of one has a job setting up shell companies with fake cash flow for struggling small business owners, who then use them to raise new loans to pay off their previous creditors. But even this dubious line of business, which should thrive in a downturn, is suffering from China’s economic slowdown. Last month, Zhou’s income fell to a fraction of last year’s levels. Zhou, who did not want to give his full name, now plans to return to his family farm in the poorer central province of Henan and sell organic eggs. “I don’t know who to blame for the economic downturn but all I know is that this year the economy is really bad,” he says. “Lay-offs everywhere.” As China’s economic growth slows, stories such as Zhou’s abound. The country’s 296mn migrant workers are facing slowing wage growth, its new university graduates are struggling to find jobs, the urban middle class has lost money in a policy-induced property meltdown and the rich are reeling from Beijing’s crackdowns on the internet, finance and health sectors. National security regulations are worrying foreign companies, many of which have stopped investing. Only those working in some areas of the government or sectors deemed strategic, such as semiconductors, are being spared. Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong who embarked on an unprecedented third term in March, claims everything is going to plan. The country is marching towards “national rejuvenation” and “high-quality development” as the party’s “common prosperity” policy reduces inequality. But beneath the triumphant rhetoric, many observers wonder whether policymaking is adrift. The Communist party used to allow its people abundant economic opportunity in exchange for heavy restrictions on their political freedom. Now the so-called social contract is no longer clear. In the place of growth and opportunity are vague promises of security and “a better life”. But with about 600mn people struggling to get by on less than $140 a month, will that be enough? A once optimistic society now worries about the future. “The old contract was a pretty simple one which is: ‘We’ll stay out of politics, we won’t express sensitive opinions, provided we can expect to be prosperous in the future’,” says George Magnus, author of Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy, and a research associate at the University of Oxford’s China Centre.  That “has been undermined and not just by the fact that China’s old development model is not really working anymore but also by the government’s own culpability for not addressing the issues,” he says. “Fundamentally, it’s an issue of trust.” After securing his second term as party secretary at the 19th party congress in 2017, Xi signalled a “new deal” for China, according to a paper at the time by Evan Feigenbaum, of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.  Chinese Marxists think in terms of contradictions — the dialectical opposition of different forces or influences, Feigenbaum wrote. During the reform and opening up period that followed the end of the Mao era, the party concentrated on economic growth, or resolving the “contradiction” between the people’s “ever-growing material” needs and the country’s “backward social production”, according to an account of Xi’s comments at the congress in state media. But Xi declared China was facing a new challenge. After decades of rapid growth, he said the “principle contradiction” was “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life”. These “needs”, he said, included “demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment”.  Security was the keyword, analysts say. When Xi became party leader in 2012, the organisation was concerned that the growing private sector was empowering entrepreneurs and eclipsing the apparatchiks. In 2013, the party circulated an internal memo, Document Number Nine, attacking western constitutional democracy and other ideas, such as universal human rights and ardently pro-market “neoliberalism”. In the ensuing years, Xi has rooted out dissent and enforced party discipline through endless anti-corruption campaigns while pursuing a more assertive foreign policy, alienating large trading partners such as the US.  “The so-called anti-corruption campaign is just . . . an instrument [the Communist party] wants to use to purge everyone who is not loyal,” says Xu Chenggang, senior research scholar at Stanford University’s Center on China’s Economy and Institutions. This tightening of control is pervasive, from limits on the publication of economic data and investigations of foreign consultancies under data and anti-espionage laws, to the detention of a million Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the sinicisation of religion and culture, analysts say. “Security is a requisite for development. That’s been a pretty clear part of the social contract under Xi Jinping,” says Drew Thompson, a China expert at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. But it was in 2021, as the economy was recovering from the first shock of the onset of Covid-19, that Xi launched one of his most decisive campaigns yet to meet the people’s aspirations for a “better life” — what he called “common prosperity”.  Beijing cracked down on the internet empire of billionaire Jack Ma, leading him to largely disappear from public, and the country’s other important internet groups, shutting down overnight the whole industry of online tutoring and restricting online gaming for children. In a speech on common prosperity at the party’s central committee for financial and economic affairs in August 2021, Xi expounded on the policy’s deeper aims. Cadres must “resolutely oppose the unlimited sprawl of capital” and “uphold the dominant role of the public sector”, he said, while also somehow mobilising “the zeal of entrepreneurs”.  Tellingly, this was not a call for a European-style social welfare state. The party was pursuing its long-term strategic objectives of building China “into a great modern socialist country”, he said, but it must not “fall into the trap of ‘welfarism’ that encourages laziness”. The result of the top-down attempt to re-engineer society was disastrous for investment sentiment, especially when it coincided with increasing geopolitical tensions with the US, Beijing’s zero-Covid policy and the “three red lines” — a scheme to force deleveraging in the over-indebted property sector. China’s tech stocks listed in the US have fallen 70 per cent between February 2021 and today. While some of that is due to external factors, domestic policy has not helped. In June, the youth unemployment rates hit 21.3 per cent before the government stopped releasing the figures, a likely byproduct of the shrinking of the internet sector that was a big employer of young graduates. Official data for average primary market housing prices shows them drifting lower in September. “The tragedy of Xi Jinping’s economic policy is he has identified some problems China needs to fix but has gone about it the wrong way,” says Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. Back in Yuxinzhuang village, a woman surveys the destruction outside her small grocery shop. The flats across the road are being torn down because they were constructed years ago on former village land without the correct zoning, she says.  Some migrant worker residents suspect the real purpose is to drive them out of Beijing. The capital is one of China’s “first tier” cities, where most migrant workers do not have the money or qualifications to qualify for hukou, the household registration stamp that would give them full access to public services such as health and education. “It’s had a huge impact on us,” says the woman, who is from eastern Shandong province, of the demolitions. Sales have plunged as people leave the area, she adds. For most economists, the structural challenges facing China’s economy have been apparent for more than a decade — especially its reliance on debt-fuelled investment in infrastructure and property and the relatively low share of domestic consumption in gross domestic product. With property no longer a driver, many are wondering what will replace it. An electric vehicle boom is one bright spot. But high-end manufacturing, though favoured by Beijing, will not generate enough jobs.  Even as total debt — household, corporate and government — hit 281.5 per cent of GDP in the second quarter, according to calculations by Bloomberg, productivity advances have slowed and the demographic outlook has worsened, with the population officially declining for the first time last year. The government has set a target for growth in GDP this year of 5 per cent, its lowest in decades. The IMF estimates this could fall below 4 per cent in the years to come. Economists point to a list of reforms that could turn the situation around. Bert Hofman, a former Beijing-based country director for China at the World Bank, in a blog post titled “Diminishing Expectations” lists sweeping fiscal, financial, retirement age and pension, state-owned enterprise and hukou reforms. “None of these reforms are easy, and each one cuts into the interest of some groups in society . . . but the package as a whole should increase the pie for all,” he says. Others say if the government is serious about really implementing “common prosperity”, it would have ended hukou, which they say has turned rural and migrant workers into “second-class” citizens. While there has been some reform of the system, abolishing it could increase urbanisation, revive property demand and increase people’s average incomes, analysts say. Hofman writes that about 65 per cent of the population lives in urban areas but about 20 percentage points of this are migrant workers. About 25 per cent of the labour force still works in agriculture. “It gives the lie to common prosperity,” John Burns, an honorary professor of politics and public administration at the University of Hong Kong, says of hukou. “Rural people have paid the price for all this prosperity in the cities.” China’s average annual pension per head for urban residents was Rmb50,763 ($6,936) in 2021, about 22 times the rural equivalent, while civil servants received Rmb77,804. The average annual healthcare disbursements for urban residents in 2021 totalled Rmb4,166, about 4.4 times the rural equivalent. But today’s economic malaise reaches beyond the rural and urban poor. Upper-middle-class people talk of losing millions of renminbi in property and failed wealth management plans, while the wealthy elites complain about a lack of investment opportunities and increasing government interference. One mining company owner in southern Guangdong province says local authorities kept borrowing money from him with no intention of paying it back, giving him cheap land instead. This had little value given the property crisis so he ended up investing his money in a chicken farm out of reach of the officials. “There has been a lot of talk about the government supporting the private sector,” he says. “In reality we are under pressure to bail out cash-strapped local governments.” In the rural eastern province of Anhui, a woman mourning China’s former premier Li Keqiang, who died suddenly on Friday, captures the complexity of people’s feelings about China’s leaders. The government’s focus on security — Beijing has constructed one of the world’s most extensive surveillance states — has meant far less crime in her local area, says the woman. “Thanks to the surveillance system, I can now hop on a public bus without worrying about being pickpocketed,” she says, after placing flowers at Li’s ancestral home in Jiuzi village.  But she, like many of the mourners, betrays a yearning for a leadership more sympathetic to her daily struggles. Many saw that in Li, who until March was Xi’s number-two official, saying he spoke out for the poor.  “He was a great premier,” she says, choking with emotion. Unlike Xi and many other senior leaders, Li grew up in a modest neighbourhood, where traditional Anhui beef noodle shops still ply their trade.  Seen as a pro-market reformer who was supported by former president Hu Jintao, Li was once believed to be a contender for the presidency but the party chose Xi, who took it in a more austere direction. “Some senior leaders wanted to build a strong nation at the expense of ordinary people’s wealth and opportunities,” says a second mourner at Li’s former childhood home in the nearby provincial capital of Hefei. “Premier Li wanted to make ordinary people rich first and then create a strong nation.” Some political scientists argue that the party’s emphasis on social issues and common prosperity rather than growth has been a power play aimed at rolling back the private sector, which grew too powerful under previous presidents, providing 80 per cent of China’s employment. Stanford’s Xu says common prosperity created a convenient platform to blame entrepreneurs for the troubles of the poor while undermining their influence. The problem was that it got mixed in with a slowdown brought on by the zero-Covid policy and property woes. “If we put all of this together, now the Chinese economy is in deep trouble,” Xu says. Most analysts argue the government has temporarily softened its crackdown on the private sector as it tries to stabilise the economy.  Many economists are now looking to the third plenum, an important party meeting that occurs one year after a new leadership takes office and which is expected to be held before the end of this year, for signs of the government’s broader plans for the economy, though few are optimistic on the prospect for deeper reforms.  “The fact that there is maybe this sense of drift or lack of confidence in the future, I think, is a corrosive phenomenon that we’re not used to seeing in China and, politically, I should think that the government ought to be worried about it,” says Oxford’s Magnus. Few think that growing frustration with the economy will imminently lead to social unrest, however. Thompson points out that it took the “grossest violations of civil liberties” during China’s extended Covid lockdowns to spark the so-called “white paper protests” in November 2022, when people in many cities, including Beijing and Shanghai, held blank sheets of paper symbolising everything they could not say.  But more likely is a loss of China’s former optimism that will be challenging to reignite or, says Xu, a slow slide into passive cynicism. The second Li mourner, in Hefei, who works for a real estate company and soon expects to lose his job, speaks to the uncertainty being felt in communities across China: “We just don’t know what tomorrow will bring.” Data visualisation by Keith Fray. ©The Financial Times Limited 2023. All Rights Reserved. FT and Financial Times are trademarks of the Financial Times Ltd. Not to be redistributed, copied or modified in any way.

Minst 35 döda i Kina – bil körde in i folkmassa

Minst 35 döda i Kina – bil körde in i folkmassa

Händelsen inträffade vid en sportarena vid åttatiden på måndagskvällen. Enligt flera medier ska bilen ha kört in i en folkmassa som utförde någon form av träningsaktivitet på arenan. – Den körde runt och runt och människor skadades på alla delar av löpbanan – öst, syd, väst och nord, säger ett annat vittne till det kinesiska nyhetsmagasinet Caixin. Bilder från platsen visade flera personer liggandes livlösa på marken efter att bilen kört runt. Många av de som skadats eller dödats är äldre, men det finns även barn bland offren. ”Extremt illvillig natur” Föraren, en man i 62-årsåldern, greps när han försökte fly platsen. Motivet bakom händelsen är ännu inte känt, men enligt ett utlåtande från den kinesiska polisen ska mannen ha varit missnöjd med en skilsmässouppgörelse. ”Poliser fann honom när han skadade sig själv med en kniv i bilen. De stoppade honom och körde honom till sjukhus för vård. På grund av allvarliga skador i nacken är han medvetslös och har ännu inte kunnat höras ”, skriver polisen i ett utlåtande. Den kinesiske presidenten Xi Jinping manar till största möjliga ansträngningar för att vårda de skadade. Han har också krävt att gärningsmannen ska straffas hårt, och beskriver brottet som en ”extremt illvillig natur”, enligt det statliga tv-bolaget CCTV. Censureras På tisdagen har sökningar i sociala medier om händelsen censurerats kraftigt och kinesiska mediers artiklar om händelser som publicerats på måndagskvällen har tagits bort. Hundratals invånare samlas regelbundet vid sportarenan i Zhuhai för att friidrotta, spela fotboll och umgås. Arenan har meddelat att den kommer att hålla stängt tills vidare.

Därför reste Orban till Georgien – trots anklagelser om valfusk

Därför reste Orban till Georgien – trots anklagelser om valfusk

I lördags gick Georgien till val i vad som benämnts som ett ödesval. Initialt såg det positivt ut för oppositionen, men när 99 procent av rösterna var räknade hade regeringspartiet Georgisk dröm fått över 50 procent av rösterna. En rysk påverkansoperation, menade den georgiska oppositionella presidenten Salome Zourabichvili som manade till massiva protester i Tbilisi. Även från svenskt håll kritiserades valet. – Vi har inte fått de slutliga rapporterna men allting talar för att det har skett många oegentligheter, att det är ett val som inte är pålitligt, att det har skett rent fusk på olika sätt, säger statsminister Ulf Kristersson till TT. Experten förutsåg Orbáns drag Efter valet fyllde demonstranter gatorna i Tbilisi. Oppositionella har vädjat om stöd från det internationella samfundet och EU och demonstranter fyllde gatorna i Tbilisi. Samtidigt anlände Viktor Orbán, premiärministern i Ungern som innehar ordförandeskapet i EU, till huvudstaden. Orbán gratulerade regeringen och beskrev valet som fritt och demokratiskt. Flera organisationer, bland annat OSSE, rapporterar att det förekommit valfusk. En som förutsåg Orbáns agerande redan i våras, i samband med att den ”utländska agent-lagen” klubbades igenom, är Daniel Hegedüs, regionalchef för Centraleuropa på tankesmedjan German Marshall Fund. I en artikel i EUobserver skrev han redan i maj om hur Ungern kunde komma att utnyttja det roterande ordförandeskapet för att legitimera valet för den georgiska regeringen – trots ouppklarade frågor om valfusk. – De skapar nära band till de som utmanar EU och väst. Länder som Ryssland och Kina, men även till mindre länder som Azerbaijan och i detta fallet Georgien, säger Daniel Hegedüs till TV4 Nyheterna. Kan komma att stoppa sanktioner De ungerska relationerna till de länder som vågar utmana EU kan sedan användas som en påtryckningsmetod mot EU, menar Daniel Hegedüs. Liknande metoder har använts i förhållande till Ukraina. – Jag tror vi kan förvänta oss att de kommer gå så långt att EU troligtvis inte kommer kunna införa sanktioner mot företrädare för Georgisk dröm, likt USA tidigare infört. Man kan förvänta sig att Ungern kommer motsätta sig sådana försök, säger Hegedüs. Ungern, som nu innehar ordförandeskapet, försöker främst utnyttja sin roll på två sätt, enligt Hegedüs. I början av ordförandeskapet försökte de öka sitt strategiska manöverutrymme och stärka sin utrikespolitiska självständighet. Då besökte Orbán bland annat Putin i Moskva och Xi Jinping i Peking. – Det andra är att störa EU:s utrikes- och institutionella politik. Det främjar den ungerska regimen men även ryska intressen, det är tydligt även i det georgiska valet, säger Hegedüs. Värderingsbaserad allians De två regeringspartierna Georgisk dröm och ungerska Fidesz har de senaste åren kommit allt närmare varandra. Georgiens premiärminister, Irakli Kobakhidze, beskrev besöket som ett ”bevis på den nära vänskapen mellan våra länder, byggd på delade värderingar”. – En allians har vuxit fram, främst baserad på gemensamma illiberala värderingar och intressen kopplade till inhemsk auktoritär utveckling säger Hegedüs. När EU valde att stoppa den georgiska processen för att ansluta sig till unionen i samband med att den ”utländska agent-lagen” klubbades igenom, fortsatte Ungern att stötta Georgien och dess beslut. – Det är uppenbart att de har en mycket nära relation, en som gör att premiärminister Orbán inte tvekar att gå i konflikt med EU, säger Hegedüs.

Elon Musk och Putin i hemliga samtal – ska ha pågått i flera år

Elon Musk och Putin i hemliga samtal – ska ha pågått i flera år

Samtalen mellan Musk och Putin, som varit igång sedan slutet av 2022, ska ha handlat om både personliga ämnen, affärer och geopolitiska spänningar, skriver The Wall Street Journal. Att miljardären och den ryska presidenten har samtalat flera gånger är något som flera före detta och nuvarande amerikanska, ryska och europeiska tjänstemän uppger för tidningen. Elon Musk är grundare av SpaceX som driver tjänsten Starlink. Företaget är Nasas och Pentagons primära raketuppskjutare. Det gör att Musk har viss tillgång till hemligstämplad information, och har starka band till amerikanska militären. Enligt två av källorna ska Putin ha bett Musk att inte aktivera sin Starlink-satellitinternettjänst över Taiwan, vilket var en tjänst till Kinas ledare Xi Jinping. Kreml: Har bara hänt en gång Elon Musk har inte kommenterat uppgifterna. Dmitry Peskov, talesperson för Kreml, bekräftar inte att det har skett några regelbundna samtal med Musk, men säger att ett samtal ägt rum en gång och då över telefon. Då ska Musk och Putin ha diskuterat ”rymden och nuvarande och framtida teknik”. Elon Musk sa i oktober 2022 att han haft ett samtal med Putin en gång i april 2021, ett samtal som ska ha handlat om rymden. ”De älskar det inte” Enligt källorna är samtalen mellan ryska presidenten och miljardären en väl bevarad hemlighet i den amerikanska regeringen. Flera som tidningen har pratat med visste inte om kontakten. En person som tidningen pratar med menar att det uppstår ett dilemma eftersom man förlitar sig på Musks rymdraketer. Samtidigt finns inga larm om säkerhetsintrång. – De älskar det inte, säger personen om var regeringen anser om kontakterna mellan Musk och Putin.

Utspelet: "Han vet att jag är galen"

Utspelet: "Han vet att jag är galen"

Det är extremt jämnt inför presidentvalet i USA som avgörs i början av november. Siffrorna varierar dag för dag. Ibland leder Republikanernas kandidat Donald Trump och ibland leder Demokraternas kandidat Kamala Harris. Om det skulle bli expresidenten Donald Trump som vinner valet så är han säker på en sak. Nämligen att Kina inte skulle våga provocera honom då ”Xi Jinping vet att jag är galen”, säger han i en intervju med The Wall Street Journal. – Jag hade en väldigt stark relation med honom. Han var faktiskt en riktigt god, jag vill inte säga vän, jag vill inte säga något dumt, men vi kom väldigt bra överens, säger Trump. Hotar med höga tullar I intervjun säger han också att han skulle införa tullar på mellan 150 och 200 procent mot Kina om de inför en blockad mot Taiwan. Trump får också frågan om amerikanska soldater skulle kunna sättas in i samband med det. – Jag skulle inte behöva det, eftersom han (Xi Jinping reds. anm.) respekterar mig och vet att jag är galen, säger han. Samtalen med Putin Donald Trump säger också att han och Vladimir Putin hade flera samtal under hans tid i Vita Huset och att han kom bra överens med den ryske presidenten. – Jag sa: ”Vladimir, om du ger dig på Ukraina kommer jag slå till mot dig så hårt att du inte kommer fatta vad som hände. Jag kommer slå till mot dig mitt i Moskva. Vi är vänner, jag vill inte göra det, men jag har inget alternativ”, säger han i intervjun.

Xi Jinping på YouTube

The rise of Xi Jinping, explained

How Xi Jinping became China's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong Help keep Vox free for everybody: ...

Vox på YouTube

Xi Jinping confronts Justin Trudeau at G20 over 'leaked' conversation details

China's president, Xi Jinping. confronted the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, at the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, ...

Guardian News på YouTube

History of Xi Jinping

Join my community at http://johncoogan.com (enter your email) SOURCES: This would have been impossible without this ...

John Coogan på YouTube

The world of China’s President Xi Jinping | DW Documentary

President Xi Jinping wants to establish the People's Republic of China as the leading world power of tomorrow. Never before has ...

DW Documentary på YouTube

How Xi Jinping Became China’s Leader for Life

Xi Jinping secured a historic third term as head of the Chinese Communist Party. Amid a punishing zero-Covid strategy, ...

VICE News på YouTube

Xi Jinping i poddar

Redder than red

Xi Jinping is born into the top rung of China's elite. But his family is torn apart while he is still a child. The Economist's Sue-Lin Wong finds out why Xi kept faith in the Communist revolution.Subscribe to The Economist with the best offer at economist.com/chinapod.

Hide and bide

As a modest provincial official in Fujian, Xi Jinping is outshone by his celebrity wife, while colleagues are caught up in a lurid corruption scandal. How does Xi survive? Subscribe to The Economist with the best offer at economist.com/chinapod.

Biden and Xi mend ties

A recent visit to the US by China’s president Xi Jinping has raised hopes of a bilateral rapprochement. But how stable is this more positive relationship and can a conflict over Taiwan be averted? Gideon discusses these questions with Washington-based China experts Evan Medeiros and Jude Blanchette. Clip: CNBCFree links to read more on this topic:America and a crumbling global orderMoody’s cuts China’s credit outlook to negativeUS, UK and Australia move to track ‘emerging threats’ in spaceEU must stand up for Taiwan at China summitSubscribe to The Rachman Review wherever you get your podcasts - please listen, rate and subscribe.Presented by Gideon Rachman. Produced by Fiona Symon. Sound design is by Breen TurnerRead a transcript of this episode on FT.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Two Superpowers Walk Into a Garden

One of the most highly anticipated diplomatic events of the year took place this week in a mansion outside San Francisco. President Biden and Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, met to repair their countries’ relations, which had sunk to one of their lowest points in decades.Edward Wong, a diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times, discusses the effort to bring the relationship back from the brink.Guest: Edward Wong, a diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times.Background reading: Both American and Chinese accounts of the meeting indicated scant progress on the issues that have pushed the two nations to the edge of conflict.China’s depiction of Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit reflected his sometimes-contradictory priorities: to project both strength and a willingness to engage with Washington.For more information on today’s episode, visit nytimes.com/thedaily. Transcripts of each episode will be made available by the next workday.

Introducing The Prince

Xi Jinping is the most powerful person in the world. But the real story of China’s leader remains a mystery. The Economist’s Sue-Lin Wong finds out how he rose to the top in a new podcast series launching on September 28th. For more China coverage, subscribe to The Economist and find a special offer at economist.com/chinapod.

January 3rd, 2024: Hamas Hit, Xi’s Rare Reveal, & Gay Gone

In this episode of The President's Daily Brief: We uncover the details of the Israeli military's strategic operation that neutralized a key Hamas figure, escalating tensions in the Middle East. We discuss President Xi Jinping's startling admission about China's economic struggles in his New Year's Eve speech, a first in his tenure. We recount the shocking assault on South Korean opposition leader Lee Jae-myung and his narrow escape from what could have been a fatal incident. Our coverage extends to America's southern border, where December saw an unprecedented surge in illegal migrant encounters, raising alarms on national security. And we conclude with the unfolding story of Harvard University President Claudine Gay, who resigns amid a scandal.   Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. Email: PDB@TheFirstTV.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Chairman Mao Zedong vs. President Xi Jinping

The hosts unravel the lives and legacies of two Chinese dictators; Chairman Mao Zedong and current President of China Xi Jinping. They discuss Mao's involvement in the creation of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese civil war fighting the Nationalists, the world war fighting the Japanese, his brutality in taking control of China, the millions of deaths in his Great Leap Forward and the hysteria and horror of the Mao's Cultural Revolution. They also discuss President Xi Jinping's suffering under Mao, his ascension to the top of the CCP, the genocide of the Uyghur people, the attempted cover up of the coronavirus outbreak, his crackdown on Hong Kong and future plans for Taiwan. These two dictators battle it out in Round 19 of the knock-out tournament to determine the single greatest dictator of all time. One of these two dictators will be eliminated from the tournament and the other will remain in contention to be crowned history's biggest dictator.

Xi Jinping: The man behind the myth

This August, we're revisiting some of our favourite episodes from the past year.Xi Jinping is consolidating his position as the all-powerful president of China. But who is the man at the top of the sharpest pyramid in the world of politics?This podcast was brought to you thanks to the support of readers of The Times and The Sunday Times. Subscribe today and get one month free at: thetimes.co.uk/storiesofourtimes.Host: David Aaronovitch.Guest: Michael Sheridan, former foreign correspondent for The Sunday Times and author of The Gate to China: A New History of the People's Republic & Hong Kong.Clips: ABC, South China Morning Post, No Comment TV, BBC, CCTV Video News Agency, Periscope Film, Al Jazeera, CBS, VICE News. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Xi Jinping-Biden meeting to focus on US election concerns

Xi Jinping-Biden meeting to focus on US election concerns

How Xi Jinping did it

Just over a decade ago, President Xi Jinping was a virtual unknown. Few would say that now. In ten years, he’s reworked the Chinese Communist party, the military and the government so that he’s firmly in control. He’s also vanquished all of his obvious rivals. And now, he’s about to extend his time in office. Some say Xi might stay in the top job indefinitely. So how did Xi Jinping do it? Celia Hatton, the BBC’s Asia Pacific Editor, speaks to fellow China watchers to find out.Producer: Rob Walker Editor: Clare Fordham Researcher: Ben Cooper Studio Manager: James Beard Production Coordinators: Maria Ogundele and Helena Warwick-CrossWith special thanks to Kerry Allen.(Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the art performance celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China in 2021. Credit: Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

Cut The Clutter : Understanding Xi Jinping’s defence & military-industry ‘purge’, corruption & ‘self-revolution’

Chinese President Xi Jinping has been carrying out a purge within the corridors of power as part of his “crackdown” on the “cancer of corruption”. The latest officials netted in this drive, now in its second decade, include nine top generals and three leaders of state-owned military enterprises. In episoe 1377 of #CutTheClutter, Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta discusses Xi’s purge, what’s driving it, and how it plays into his larger strategic agenda. https://www.youtube.com/@CoorgWildernessResort More here - https://www.coorgwildernessresort.in