Brittisk försvarsjätte ska bygga ubåtar åt Australien

Brittisk försvarsjätte ska bygga ubåtar åt Australien

Storbritanniens regering ger BAE Systems ett jättekontrakt på nästan 4 miljarder pund, motsvarande knappt 53 miljarder kronor, för att utveckla nästa generations attackubåtar, skriver Reuters. Ordern är en del av Aukus-pakten med USA och Australien för att leverera kärnkraftsdrivna ubåtar under nästa decennium. Projektet ska hjälpa Australien att kontra mot Kinas upptrappningar i Oceanien och farkosterna väntas levereras i slutet av 2030-talet. Ordern betyder mycket för den brittiska försvarsjätten BAE, som räknar med att affären leder till 5 000 nya jobbtillfällen. Vi går mot en händelserik ekonomihöst. Är noteringsklimatet på väg att bli hett igen? Vad händer med bomarknaden när alla bundna lån löper ut? Och hur ska det gå för den historiskt svaga kronan? Med Omni Ekonomi, Omnis systerapp, får du alla affärsnyheter du behöver på ett ställe. Lägg därtill dagliga aktieanalyser direkt i appen, kommentarer från hundratals experter, fördjupning och förklaring, samt upplåst innehåll från världens ledande medier. Och mycket mer.

Så förbereder sig Ukraina för ett utdraget krig

Så förbereder sig Ukraina för ett utdraget krig

I Ukraina börjar allt fler inse att kriget mot Ryssland kan komma att bli utdraget. För Ukrainas del handlar det inte bara om att ta tillbaka de ockuperade områdena, men att göra det utan att onödigt många liv går till spillo, har president Volodymyr Zelenskyj förklarat för The Economist. Men ett långdraget krig ställer också andra krav på den militära planeringen, ekonomin och det ukrainska samhället i stort. Den improvisationsförmåga som Ukraina hade stor nytta av i inledningen av kriget räcker inte längre till, skriver tidningen. The improvisation and decentralisation of the early part of the war will no longer suffice By The Economist 12 September, 2023 In the autumn sunshine Kyiv looks glorious. The leafy streets are full of life: café terraces bustle and hipsters throng the bars of Podil, a trendy neighbourhood. The odd air-raid siren aside, the main signs of the 18-month-old war with Russia are rusty tanks turned into makeshift war memorials and the various men in uniform enjoying some leave with their loved ones. To Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top soldier, the scenes of children eating ice cream and men presenting flowers to their sweethearts are satisfying. “This is what we are fighting for. I just want people to have a normal life in the whole of Ukrainian territory,” he says. The critical word is “whole”: Ukraine’s counter-offensive has not yet produced the results he and others hadhoped for. Russian lines have not crumbled. Almost a fifth of Ukrainian territory remains in Russia’s hands. In the war of attrition that looms, it is not clear which side has more staying power. In part, of course, that depends on a second uncertainty: in what quantities the military and financial support supplied by Ukraine’s allies will keep flowing as the war grinds on. For all its superficial normality, Kyiv is awash with apprehension. Ukrainians know that Russia has been stockpiling missiles and drones to attack their energy infrastructure when temperatures drop. They know that the supply of volunteers has dried up, and that men are being conscripted to replace casualties at the front. And they know no end is in sight: a year ago 50% of them thought it would be over within a year. Now only 34% believe that. Whereas Vladimir Putin, Russia’s dictator, does not care about the lives of his own troops, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, presides over a democratic society which does. “It is not just about de-occupation [at any cost]. It’s about de-occupation, but not losing a lot of lives,” he recently told The Economist. The prospect of an attenuated struggle has started to seep into Mr Zelensky’s speeches. “We need to learn to live with [the conflict],” he told Ukrainians recently. “It depends on what kind of war. We are prepared to keep fighting for a very long period of time…[while] minimising the number of casualties. Like in Israel, for example. We can live like that.” A war of endurance, however, will require big changes in military planning, the economy and society more broadly. The heroic improvisation and decentralisation of the early part of the war will no longer suffice. On the military side, Mr Zelensky has initiated a clear shift by installing a new minister of defence, Rustem Umerov. Like almost all Ukrainians, he has a personal stake in the war, as a Crimean Tatar, an ethnic group persecuted for Ukrainian sympathies since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. But, he says, “Ukraine is not about emotions, it is about a system, logistics and industries.” Mr Umerov, a 41-year-old former entrepreneur and investor, says his mission is to build the capacity of both Ukraine’s defence industry and its soldiers, so that Western allies see Ukraine not as a dependent always begging for aid, but as a partner, capable of shaping its own fortune. His previous job was managing the government’s property portfolio, and he wants to bring an efficient managerial mindset to his new role. Red tape must be eliminated. “Anything that can be digitised, needs to be digitised,” he says. He is not afraid to make waves: after two weeks in the job, he replaced six of his seven deputies. When it was part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had a vast defence industry. Some 1.5m Ukrainians laboured in 700 military enterprises, including 205 factories and 130 research and development sites. Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s second president, ran the world’s biggest rocket plant in the city of Dnipro in Soviet times. A flagship factory in Kharkiv produced 900 tanks a year. But corruption and neglect after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 gradually killed these businesses. Now Ukraine is rebuilding its arms industry almost from scratch. “Anything that can be produced locally, must be produced locally,” Mr Umerov insists. In part that involves reforming state enterprises, the job of Oleksandr Kamyshin, a former investment banker who used to run the state railway company and follows Western management fads. “The first hundred days of the war were about bravery. The next 1,000 days are about steeliness,” he declares. In June, three months after his appointment, Ukraine produced as many shells as it had in the entire previous year. In July it reached double that, Mr Kamyshin says. Mr Umerov wants to encourage private arms manufacturers, which account for only 20-30% of the local industry. He says he is prepared to pay local firms in advance if they can demonstrate their ability to make useful kit. Many are struggling with a dearth of capable managers: the defence ministry is offering to help bring such people back from the front lines. Within five years, Mr Kamyshin predicts, private firms will produce 80% of local output. One focus is on drones. Ukraine’s output of them has grown exponentially, albeit from a tiny base. “We will [produce] 120 to 150 times more drones than we did last year,” says Mykhailo Fedorov, the 32-year-old minister for digital transformation, who is co-ordinating the effort. The number of local firms in the business has risen from seven in December to 70 now, the vast majority of them private. To encourage this growth the government has eliminated tariffs on imported components and is buying drones at prices that allow margins of as much as 25%. “We can win in a technological war,” says Mr Fedorov. “We are getting help from countries with large economies and a greater level of freedom. Technologies like freedom and they like mobility. We have both.” Mr Kamyshin wants Western military contractors to start localising their production, too. bae Systems, a British defence firm which makes lots of weapons supplied to Ukraine, has set up a local subsidiary, hoping to produce l119 and m777 howitzers, which are both in wide use at the front. Rheinmetall, Germany’s biggest arms manufacturer, is already repairing Leopard tanks in Ukraine and plans to open an armoured-vehicle factory soon. As Armin Papperger, its ceo, told cnn, “[Ukrainians] have to help themselves. If they always have to wait [for] Europeans or Americans [to] help them over the next ten or 20 years…that is not possible.” Protecting such factories from Russian attacks will require ingenuity. “We will not have one Soviet-style hypergiant plant but many smaller plants spread across the country,” says Mr Kamyshin. Drones are proof of what is possible: Ukraine’s surging output of reconnaissance devices, Mr Fedorov says, has helped give it parity with Russia’s forces. Production of longer-range ones, which can hit targets in Crimea and deep inside Russia, is also growing. “It is an important historical moment,” he says, “when we are not simply receiving aid and hoping [that it will not run out] but when we are taking responsibility for our own lives in our own hands and starting to form our own capability.” Ukraine’s growing drone industry also allows its armed forces to adopt new tactics, by taking the war inside Russia. One aim is to hit military factories in an effort to disrupt whole supply chains. Recent examples include an attack on a facility that produces decalin, a fuel additive essential for rockets, and a plant that makes circuitry for Kinzhal and Iskander missiles. A second aim is psychological: to shatter the facade of normality the Kremlin tries to preserve, particularly in big cities such as Moscow. Airports there have had to suspend flights for brief spells almost daily in recent weeks owing to drone attacks on the city. (Mr Kamyshin says he would like to set up a shop selling t-shirts with the slogan “Moscow never sleeps”.) Ukraine also has a third goal in its strikes on Russian infrastructure: to deter Russian attacks on its own infrastructure. Since Russia withdrew in July from a deal allowing exports of grain from Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea, it has been bombarding those and other export routes and threatening ships calling at Ukrainian ports. Ukraine’s exports have halved as a result, doing yet more damage to an already stricken economy. Ukraine is trying to break the Russian blockade. Last month it established a new sea route, hugging the western coast of the Black Sea close to Romania and Bulgaria. If Ukraine can protect it, it could raise its exports to some 70% of pre-war levels. On September 17th, two ships docked at the port of Chornomorsk near Odessa to load almost 20,000 tonnes of wheat. Hours later Russia unleashed a barrage of drones and missiles at other nearby ports. Ukrainian strategists hope that, if they can threaten Russian ports on the Black Sea and strike at the military bases from which attacks on Ukrainian ports are launched, they may be able to keep Ukraine’s exports afloat. Earlier this month Ukrainian missiles damaged a submarine, a ship and port facilities at a Russian naval base in Crimea. It had decent air defences, but more distant Russian facilities may not be as protected. The focus on protecting exports reflects a sense among Ukrainian officials that the economy will also need a drastic overhaul to cope with a long war. Ukraine received $31bn in financial aid last year and is on course to receive even more this year. But Serhiy Marchenko, the finance minister, assumes that such largesse will not be forthcoming indefinitely. Meanwhile, military spending has leapt from 5% of gdp before the war to 26% this year. Even if the fighting stopped, spending might not drop much. General Zaluzhny says, “I want the Ukrainian army to be so strong that Russia does not even dare to look in our direction.” The shrunken economy is too small to generate sufficient tax revenue to pay for Ukraine’s security, Mr Marchenko notes, so the government will have to help it grow by improving the business climate and fostering industry. The main concern for investors, says Mr Marchenko, is not physical security but the unreliable legal system, a problem that predates the war. Similarly, it is corruption rather than the damage done by the war to Ukraine’s infrastructure that most Ukrainians see as the main obstacle to recovery. The independent corruption-fighting investigators, prosecutors and courts that Ukraine has put in place are making progress, but the broader judicial system remains inefficient and unpredictable. Perhaps the worst injury that the war has inflicted on the economy has been to prompt an exodus of 7m Ukrainians—nearly 20% of the pre-war population of 37m people. More than two-thirds are women, since men of fighting age are barred from leaving the country. The working-age population has shrunk from 16.7m in 2021 to 12.4m this year. To lure people back, the government is offering startup grants for businesses and subsidised mortgages for those rebuilding homes. But many of the departed have settled in richer, more stable places in the eu, found jobs and put their children in school. They are unlikely to want more upheaval and they may see more opportunity for themselves and their children in their new homes, whatever the security situation in Ukraine. A recent survey found that about half of those who have moved to Germany, at least, intend to stay there for the foreseeable future. There is not just an economic cost to the exodus, but a social one as well. According to Olena Zelenska, Mr Zelensky’s wife, who heads a government mental-health initiative, there has already been a rise in the number of divorces “because women and children are abroad and men are here”. Mr Zelensky says there is a real risk that a war of attrition could accelerate an outflow of people from Ukraine, creating further economic problems and widening the gap between those who left and those who have stayed. This is not the only source of social tension. Roman Hasko, a lieutenant from the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade, who volunteered in the first week of the war, says he feels disappointed to see the bustle of night-time Kyiv, having just arrived on leave from the front line near Bakhmut. “I see a lot of potential recruits. I have many free positions in my unit. Not all have been killed—some are wounded or sick…If we are talking about winning this war, these empty lines need to be filled.” In the first weeks of the war men like Mr Hasko queued up to enlist. Now Ukraine is filling the ranks through conscription. Some young men who have not yet been called up are nervous about leaving home or passing checkpoints for fear of being dragooned. Many try to bribe their way out of military service and to leave the country illegally. Last month Mr Zelensky sacked the heads of all the regional military recruitment centres. He replaced them with soldiers with battlefield experience who had been vetted by intelligence services. Earlier this month the Ministry of Defence drastically cut the number of medical exemptions. Ukrainians clearly have some concerns about how the country is being run. Approval of the army and the president remain sky high, but confidence in the country’s politicians in general is down from 60% in December to 44% in June. The share of Ukrainians who say the country is on the right track has also slipped (see chart). There is disquiet about corruption in particular. But 76% tell pollsters they do not want new elections until the war is over. Support for Ukraine’s independence is the highest it has ever been, at 82%. Most do not complain about restrictions on movement or other wartime curtailment of civil liberties. “War has become part of a new horrific normal,” says Darina Solodova, a sociologist with the United Nations Development Programme in Kyiv. Resistance to Russia’s aggression remains a unifying principle for the vast majority. “It is not the question of whether to resist or not, but who has done more or less for that resistance,” says Ms Solodova. Across Ukraine 42% say that even if Russia intensifies its bombing of cities Ukraine should keep fighting. Some 21% think that the conflict should be frozen without making any concessions to Russia. Only 23% think it is worth initiating negotiations. Even in the east and south, which have borne the brunt of the war, support for negotiations is relatively low, at 32% and 39% respectively. Only 5% of Ukrainians are willing to cede any territory to Russia and only 18% to forswear joining nato. Research by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development, a think-tank in Cyprus, suggests that Ukrainians have become more optimistic about the future despite the war. Most believe that future generations will be better off. Ms Zelenska is not surprised: “People know what they are fighting for, not just what against.” © 2023 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved.

Uppstickarländer drar nytta av invasionen av Ukraina i vapenhandeln

Uppstickarländer drar nytta av invasionen av Ukraina i vapenhandeln

Nya spelare som Sydkorea och Turkiet har tagit plats vid det globala vapenhandelsbordet, skriver The Economist. Med ett förändrat geopolitisk läge finns möjlighet att utmana de fem jättarna USA, Ryssland, Frankrike, Kina och Tyskland som står för mer än tre fjärdedelar av världens vapenexport. – Sydkoreas framgångar inom vapenhandeln beror på konkurrenskraftiga kostnader, vapen av hög kvalitet och snabba leveranser, säger Tom Waldwyn på den brittiska tankesmedjan International Institute for Strategic Studies. Where to buy drones, fighters and tanks on the cheap  By The Economist 19 September, 2023 The sight of North Korea’s chubby leader, Kim Jong Un, shaking hands with Vladimir Putin on September 13th—having travelled by train to a spaceport in Russia’s far east to discuss selling its dictator a stash of Korean weapons—was remarkable both on its own terms and for what it said about the business of selling arms. The world’s five biggest arms-sellers (America, Russia, France, China and Germany) account for more than three-quarters of exports. But up-and-coming weapons producers are giving the old guard a run for their money. They are making the most of opportunities created by shifting geopolitics. And they are benefiting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Mr Kim’s trip to Russia followed a visit to Pyongyang in July by Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister, who wanted to see if North Korea could provide gear that would help his country’s faltering war effort. North Korea would love to find buyers for its military kit. And few regimes are willing to sell Russia arms. China has so far been deterred from providing much more than dual-purpose chips (although it could yet channel more lethal stuff through North Korea). Only Iran has obliged, selling some 2,400 of its Shahed “kamikaze” drones. North Korea could provide a wider range of stuff. As well as drones and missiles such as the KN-23, which is almost a replica of the Russian Iskander ballistic missile, it could offer self-propelled howitzers and multi-launch rocket systems. According to sources in American intelligence, North Korea has been delivering 152mm shells and Katyusha-type rockets to Russia for the best part of a year. Russia is shopping in Pyongyang and Tehran because both regimes are already so heavily targeted by international sanctions that they have nothing to lose and much to gain by doing business with Mr Putin’s government. They are not so much an “axis of evil” as a marketplace of pariahs. If the North Korean arms industry is being boosted by the war in Ukraine, its southern foe is doing even better. South Korea’s arms exporters were cleaning up even before the conflict. In the five years to 2022 the country rose to ninth place in a ranking of weapons-sellers compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (sipri), a think-tank (see chart); the government aspires to make South Korea the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter by 2027. Last year it sold arms worth $17bn, more than twice as much as in 2021. Some $14.5bn came from sales to Poland. The size and scope of the agreements South Korea has reached with Poland, which sees itself as a front-line country in Europe’s defence against a revanchist Russia, is jaw-dropping. The deal includes 1,000 k2 Black Panther tanks, 180 of them delivered rapidly from the army’s own inventory and 820 to be made under licence in Poland. That is more tanks than are operating in the armies of Germany, France, Britain and Italy combined. The package also includes 672 k9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers; 288 k239 Chunmoo multiple-rocket launchers; and 48 Golden Eagle fa-50s, a cut-price fourth-generation fighter jet. South Korea’s success in the arms business is down to competitive costs, high-quality weaponry and swift delivery, says Tom Waldwyn at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank based in London. Its prices reflect Korean manufacturing efficiency. The quality derives from Korea’s experience working with the best American weaponry, and from its own high-tech civil sector. Speedy delivery is possible because the Koreans, facing a major threat across their northern border, run hot production lines that can also ramp up quickly. Siemon Wezeman, a researcher with sipri’s arms-transfer programme, says wholehearted support from government and attractive credit arrangements are also critical to South Korea’s success. Asian customers like that the fact that it has close ties to America without being America, which is often seen as an unreliable ally. This could also help South Korea clinch a $45bn deal to renew Canada’s ageing submarine fleet. Questions for the future include how far South Korea will go in transferring technology to its customers—a crucial issue for Poland, which sees itself as an exporting partner of South Korea’s, competing with Germany and France in the European market. If South Korea is the undisputed leader among emerging arms exporters, second place goes to Turkey. Since the ruling ak party came to power in 2002 it has poured money into its defence industry. A goal of achieving near-autarky in weapons production has become more pressing in the face of American and European sanctions—the former imposed in 2019 after Turkey, a nato member, bought Russian s-400 surface-to-air missiles. SIPRI thinks that between 2018 and 2022 Turkey’s weapons exports increased by 69% compared to the previous five-year period, and that its share of the global arms market doubled. According to a report in July by a local industry body, the value of its defence and aerospace exports rose by 38% in 2022, compared with the previous year, reaching $4.4bn. The target for this year is $6bn. Pakistan is receiving modernised submarines from Turkey. And the last of four corvettes which Turkey has sold to the Pakistan navy was launched last month. More sales to other countries are likely, both because Turkey’s ships are competitively priced and because Turkey has few qualms about who it will sell to. Yet Turkey’s export charge is led by armed drones. On July 18th Turkey signed a $3bn agreement with Saudi Arabia to supply the Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicle (ucav). It was made by Baykar, which also produces the Bayraktar tb2—a drone that has been used in combat by Libya, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Ukraine. The tb2 was developed to hunt Kurdish militants after America refused to sell Turkey its Predator drone. More than 20 countries lined up to buy it because it was cheaper and more readily available than the American alternative, and more reliable than the Chinese ucavs that had previously dominated the non-Western market. The Akinci (pictured right, next to the TB2) is more powerful. It can carry lots of big weapons, including air-to-air missiles and the som-a, a stealthy cruise missile with a range of 250km. It will find buyers among several other Gulf countries, such as Qatar, Oman and the uae, who are keen to hedge against souring relations with America by reducing their reliance on its weaponry. These countries have ambitions to build their own defence industries; they see Turkey as a willing partner and an example to follow. Turkey’s ambitions are shown by what else is in the pipeline. Its new navy flagship, the Anadolu, is a 25,000-ton amphibious assault ship and light aircraft-carrier that will carry Bayraktar ucavs. At least one Gulf country is said to be in talks to buy a similar ship. Turkey’s fifth-generation fighter jet, the kaan, in which Pakistan and Azerbaijan are partners, should fly before the end of the year. Developed with help from Britain’s bae Systems and Rolls-Royce, the kaan could be seen as a response to Turkey’s ejection from the f-35 partner programme (as punishment for buying the s-400). Turkey will market the plane to anyone America will not sell f-35s to—or who balks at the conditions. Once again, Gulf countries may be first in line. South Korea and Turkey have benefited from the woes of their main competitors. Russia’s arms exports between 2018 and 2022 were 31% lower than in the preceding four-year period, according to sipri. It is facing further large declines because of the strain its war of aggression is putting on its defence industries, its geopolitical isolation and the efforts of two major customers, India and China, to reduce their reliance on Russian weaponry. India, previously Russia’s biggest customer, cut its purchases of Russian arms by 37% in the 2018-22 period. It is probably wishing it had gone further: Russia’s largely state-controlled arms industry is having to put its own army’s needs ahead of commitments to customers. Many of India’s 272 Su-30mkis, the backbone of its air force, are kaput because Russia cannot supply parts. Some of Russia’s weapons have performed poorly in Ukraine, compared with nato kit. And sanctions on Russia are limiting trade in things such as microchips, ball-bearings, machine tools and optical systems, which will hinder Russia’s ability to sell combat aircraft, attack helicopters and other lethal contraptions. The longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more Russia will struggle to claw back its position in the global arms market. As for China, over half its arms exports in the 2018-22 period went to just one country, Pakistan, which it sees as an ally against India. Nearly 80% of Pakistan’s major weapons needs are met by China, according to sipri. These include combat aircraft, missiles, frigates and submarines. Beijing has no interest in its customers’ human-rights records, how they plan to use what China sends or whether they are under Western sanctions. But China’s arms industry also has its problems. One challenge, says Mr Waldwyn, is that although China set out to dominate the military drone market a decade ago, its customers got fed up with poor quality and even worse support, opening a door for Turkey. A second is that, with the exception of a putative submarine deal with Thailand and a package of weapons for Myanmar, other countries in South-East Asia are tired of Chinese bullying and “won’t touch them”, says Mr Wezeman. At least China does not have to worry about competition from India. Despite much effort, India’s growth as an arms-exporter has been glacial. The government of Narendra Modi has listed a huge range of weapons parts that must be made in India; it hopes homemade light tanks and artillery will enter service by the end of the decade. But India has relied for too long on the transfer of technology from Russia under production-licensing agreements for aircraft, tanks and warships that have failed to deliver. Investment is wastefully channelled through the state-owned bodies. Red tape suffocates initiative. Projects such as the Tejas light combat aircraft have taken decades to reach production, and remain fraught with problems. The Dhruv light helicopter, launched in 2002, has crashed dozens of times. After decades in development, the Arjun Mk-2 tank turned out to be too heavy for deployment across the border with Pakistan. Locally made kit is often rejected by India’s own armed forces; “If they don’t want it, exporting it becomes impossible,” says Mr Wezeman. South Korea and Turkey show how countries can build lucrative arms businesses that underpin domestic security. India, for all its bombast, is a lesson in how not to do it. © 2023 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved.

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