Så gör Xis besatthet av säkerhet världen osäker

Så gör Xis besatthet av säkerhet världen osäker

Sedan han tog makten 2012 har Xi Jinpings fokus varit regimens säkerhet. Han har rensat ut dissidenter, byggt en övervakningsapparat utan motstycke i historien och tycks till och med beredd att offra ekonomisk tillväxt för trygghet. Det skriver Asienexperten och statsvetarprofessorn Sheena Chestnut Greitens i Foreign Affairs. Men paradoxalt nog kan Xis besatthet av säkerhet sätta Kina på kollisionskurs med andra länder – och skapa stor osäkerhet i omvärlden, enligt Chestnut Greitens. Why China Is Digging In at Home and Asserting Itself Abroad By Sheena Chestnut Greitens July 28, 2023 Since he came to power in 2012, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping has been laser-focused on ensuring the security of his regime. He has purged potential political rivals, restructured the military and internal security apparatus, built an Orwellian surveillance state, and pushed through repressive new laws in the name of national security. Undergirding all these initiatives is what Xi calls the “comprehensive national security concept,” a framework for protecting China’s socialist system and the governing authority of the Chinese Communist Party, including that of Xi himself. In an article in Foreign Affairs last October, I wrote that China’s leadership had begun to project that concept abroad through foreign policy, pursuing a grand strategy centered on regime security. In an effort to ward off external threats to China’s domestic stability and head off any possible challenges to CCP rule, Beijing seeks to weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships and promote its own model of internal security abroad. Much has changed since last October. The CCP abruptly unwound its harsh “zero COVID” policies after a wave of unusual public opposition. China’s post–pandemic economic recovery has faltered, with slow growth, a troubled property sector, and slumping foreign investment—in part because Beijing’s drive for security has led it to clamp down on foreign businesses. And as the war in Ukraine has continued, Beijing’s stance on the conflict has heightened tensions with Europe, one of China’s largest trading partners. But none of this has dented China’s commitment to security, either at home or abroad. Early clues from Xi’s third term as the country’s leader suggest that regime security concerns will continue to drive Chinese foreign policy, heightening tensions with Western countries and with some of China’s neighbors. The paradox at the heart of Xi’s quest to neutralize all threats to CCP rule is that an ostensibly defensive goal at home, protecting regime security, demands that China take increasingly assertive actions abroad. These actions, in turn, invite responses from other countries that only heighten Beijing’s fears—an escalatory cycle with no obvious off-ramp. In his “work report” to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi reminded listeners that before he became China’s preeminent leader, the country’s ability to safeguard its national security had been “inadequate” and “insufficient.” A decade after adopting his comprehensive national security concept, however, he said that national security had been “strengthened on all fronts.” He called national security “the bedrock of national rejuvenation” and indicated that China would continue to strengthen its “legal, strategy, and policy systems” for national security. Although much of what Xi said in this address repeated what he or other party leaders had said before, giving these remarks a dedicated section in the party work report for the first time codified them at an authoritative institutional level. In so doing, Xi suggested that his approach will shape Chinese security policy for at least the next five years and probably longer. In May 2023, China’s top leaders affirmed their commitment to comprehensive national security at a meeting of the Central National Security Commission, a body tasked with implementing Xi’s concept. Xi called on those present to grasp China’s “complex and severe” national security environment and to speed modernization of the country’s national security system. At the meeting, the CNSC approved documents related to risk-monitoring and early warning as well as public communication and education on national security. These themes have appeared regularly in Chinese documents and speeches on national security throughout the Xi era. China has, for example, celebrated a “national security education day” on April 15 every year since 2015, the first anniversary of the launching of the comprehensive national security concept. That Xi highlighted these issues in his October 2022 report and the CNSC has since approved related documents suggests that the CCP is now pushing forward with implementation of policies around them. Xi’s recent personnel appointments also indicate that the CCP intends to stay the course it has staked out on national security. Experience with internal security has become an important requirement for promotion to the top echelons of China’s political system. Cai Qi and Ding Xuexiang, both new members of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee, previously ran the CNSC’s General Office, a key role for pushing through Xi’s national security priorities. Other top leaders, including Zhao Leji and Li Qiang, who were named vice chairs of the CNSC alongside Cai at the May 2023 meeting, have worked either within China’s political-legal apparatus or in the party’s discipline and supervision system, which Xi reorganized and empowered to ensure that China’s security forces are responsive to party control. Xi has long seen efforts to root out corruption and strengthen party control over the military and coercive apparatus as important to regime security. A national security leadership team that blends experience in public security, party discipline, and Xi’s particular approach to national security suggests that these forces will operate in increasingly tight lockstep to uphold CCP rule. Other senior appointments also hint at Xi’s priorities for his third term. Chen Wenqing, the new chair of the Central Political-Legal Commission, is a member of the Politburo and a former minister of state security—and the first state security official in decades to fill this role. The new minister of state security, Chen Yixin, was the point person for Xi’s recent anticorruption and “education and rectification” campaigns within the internal security apparatus. Their appointments, in October, were followed in April by the passage of a revised Counterespionage Law that significantly broadened the scope of the law’s potential targets, rendering everything from market research to academic inquiry potentially suspect. Xi’s fixation on state security should not come as a surprise. Shortly before he came to power, the Chinese authorities discovered and disrupted a network of CIA informants in China, news outlets including Reuters and The New York Times have reported. One of the first official documents circulated during Xi’s tenure—the infamous Document No. 9—warned that an infiltration of Western values and ideology could destabilize China. And in a resolution on party history in 2021, the CCP Central Committee highlighted the risks of “encirclement, suppression, disruption, and subversion.” As the China scholars Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil have written, Xi’s rule has been marked by an extended anti-spy campaign and continued exhortations to be vigilant about foreign infiltration. That is in part because Xi sees internal and external security as interconnected: in his view, many of the threats to China’s internal stability come from beyond the country’s borders. Even security initiatives that could seem purely domestic, such as the party’s mass repression of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang, have been motivated at least in part by Xi’s fear that external forces might infiltrate China and threaten internal stability. As a result, Xi has methodically tightened control over any organizations that could transmit foreign influence, including religious groups, nongovernmental organizations, and most recently, foreign businesses. But more than fear of foreign infiltration is driving the securitization of China’s economy and society. During Xi’s tenure, the CCP has also fundamentally rethought the relationship between economics and security. Whereas Chinese leaders once elevated economic growth above all else, Xi and other senior officials now talk about security as a precondition for development. In the October 2022 party work report, for instance, Xi mentioned using a “new security pattern” to safeguard China’s “new development pattern,” phrasing that he repeated at the CNSC meeting in May. This rhetoric holds important clues to where China’s foreign policy is headed. The “new development pattern” refers in part to what the CCP sees as a necessary shift toward greater economic self-sufficiency to insulate the country from external “headwinds”—part of an attempt by Xi and other senior party leaders to ensure that foreign powers cannot cripple China’s economic security and stunt its progress toward “national rejuvenation.” Efforts to boost domestic demand, secure supply chains, and bolster scientific and technological innovation all fall under this heading, as does the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. Beijing has said less about its new security pattern than its new development pattern, but officials have hinted at both its importance and its reach. In April, Minister of State Security Chen Yixin called it “the main task of national security work in the present and the future.” At the CNSC meeting in May 2023, Xi called on party officials to “take the initiative to shape a favorable external security environment for China.” Like previous iterations of China’s national security discourse, this one recycles phrases used in the past. In 2017, Xi called on officials to adopt a “global vision” for national security work and stated that China should proactively shape its external security environment. One feature of Xi’s governance is that official concepts sometimes start as vague phrases, with policy details filled in later. (Other times, buzzwords appear and then fade into irrelevance, but the centrality of national security to Xi’s agenda suggests that it is not likely to disappear.) Despite the vagueness of Xi’s directive, China is seeking to strengthen its position abroad even as it justifies its more assertive behavior on defensive grounds. To protect his regime from outside forces, Xi believes, China must make the international realm more favorable to CCP rule. This is the central paradox of Xi’s preventive theory of regime security and of his view of where threats originate: ostensibly defensive ends at home require increasingly assertive means abroad. Xi’s favored vehicle for externalizing the comprehensive national security concept is the Global Security Initiative, announced in April 2022. Early writing on the GSI by Chinese analysts portrayed it as an effort to harmonize China’s “domestic security and the common security of the world.” A GSI concept paper released by China’s Foreign Ministry in February 2023 begins by referring to “Xi’s new vision of security announced in 2014,” a seemingly veiled reference to the comprehensive national security concept. Xi’s October 2022 work report also described political security—that is, the security of the CCP, its leaders, and the system it runs—as “the fundamental task” while referring to international security as “a support.” The goal of the GSI, in other words, is to use foreign policy to bolster regime security. How exactly this will work probably won’t be clear for several years. The concept paper is vague in places, likely to give the Chinese political system time to flesh out specific initiatives. But it echoes some of the core principles of the comprehensive national security concept—the indivisibility of security and development, and of domestic security and common international security, for instance—and then outlines a long list of well-known regional and global security challenges. In a speech marking the concept paper’s release, Qin Gang, then the foreign minister, was more pointed. He emphasized that “external suppression and containment against China keep escalating,” criticized “Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation,” and warned that just as China could not develop without a peaceful international environment, the world could not be secure “without the security of China.” His remarks echoed previous official statements, including China’s February 2022 announcement of a “no limits” partnership with Russia, that highlighted threats posed by the United States’ network of alliances on China’s periphery—threats that Beijing sees not just as traditional external military challenges but also as fundamental threats to China’s internal security and the stability of CCP authority over Chinese society. Through the GSI, Beijing aims to create new forms of global security governance that bypass or reduce the importance of the U.S. alliance system, thereby blunting Washington’s ability to contain China or foment “color revolutions” inside it—something Chinese leaders fear. This new security architecture does not completely jettison the old; the GSI affirms the importance of the United Nations, for example. But it also seeks to construct new regional and global security orders that advance the priorities and interests of the CCP. China has already called for changes to regional security arrangements in the Middle East, such as a reconciliation agreement that it brokered between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, publicized on the first anniversary of the GSI’s announcement. Beijing has also begun to build new forums and networks to address nontraditional security challenges (such as terrorism and domestic unrest) that are highlighted in the comprehensive national security concept. In November 2022, for instance, China hosted the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum, a gathering of law enforcement officials from around the world. Beijing is also promoting its model of domestic security and social stability to other countries. In 2021, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Public Security hosted representatives from 108 countries at a “Peaceful China” summit to show off Beijing’s approach to policing and surveillance. Such events seek to portray China as a paragon of domestic security and normalize its approach abroad while the GSI works in parallel to offer police and law enforcement training to those who might wish to emulate China’s example. To support these efforts, China’s internal security officials have increasingly become international diplomats. In 2021, for instance, Chen Wenqing, then the minister of state security and now the chair of the Central Political-Legal Commission, participated in a meeting of regional intelligence officials hosted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency. In May 2023, he met with the head of the Russia’s National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, suggesting that China is making good on its February 2022 promise to increase cooperation to oppose so-called color revolutions and “attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability.” Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong has been even more visible. Since the 20th Party Congress, he has held a videoconference with counterparts from the Pacific Islands, hosted the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum, welcomed the secretary-general of Interpol to Beijing, spoken at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, promoted the GSI at the Islamabad Security Dialogue forum, and met with a half-dozen bilateral counterparts. Conventional wisdom suggests that economic headwinds might prompt China to look to the outside world to stimulate growth. And indeed, Chinese authorities have at times tried to portray the new development pattern as compatible with continued economic openness. But because Xi sees securitization, not economic growth, as the guarantor of regime security, he is willing to accept higher economic costs in order to continue tightening control at home and improving China’s security environment abroad. This is a gamble, given that economic woes can themselves pose problems for regime stability, but Xi’s course appears to be set. China’s efforts to externalize the comprehensive national security concept through the GSI pose serious challenges for the United States. Policymakers should not underestimate the potential for Beijing’s approach to gain traction, both because of the strenuous efforts of Chinese officials and because many world leaders perceive a lack of good alternatives. Too often, the United States has portrayed itself as the chief defender of an international security order that others see as either excluding them or simply failing to solve their most pressing problems. Washington has scolded countries for entertaining Beijing’s solutions while failing to put forward viable alternatives of its own. Yet countries care primarily about solving their own security challenges. They will not reject an initiative that benefits them simply because it also benefits the CCP. But the fact that Beijing is concentrating on building new forums and networks in areas where existing international order is weak or absent, such as nontraditional security threats like crime, terrorism, and domestic unrest, also presents an opportunity for the United States. Washington has a chance to identify areas of cooperation with countries that are dissatisfied with the current global security architecture and offer them an alternative to China’s revisionist approach. For example, U.S. security assistance in Asia, which is largely focused on the military realm, leaves a gap in addressing the region’s many nontraditional security challenges—one that China’s Ministry of Public Security and the GSI have offered to fill. In offering alternatives, the United States should manage expectations. In the short term, Beijing will likely succeed in marketing itself as a “security partner of choice” to repressive leaders whose primary perceived security threats come from their own people and who find the authoritarian elements of China’s model appealing. But as the United States learned during the Cold War, security partnerships without broad popular support can be precarious and sometimes backfire. A positive alternative to China’s plan to address nontraditional security challenges wouldn’t win over everyone, but it could have a far-reaching impact on the institutions and norms of the international system—if the United States acts quickly. The Biden administration has thus far focused its coalition-building efforts mainly on strengthening its existing network of allies and partners. It should complement this approach by seeking to shore up relationships with countries that have not always had close ties with Washington, demonstrating that there is an American vision for a new and inclusive security architecture that meets the needs of a changing world—on crime, on climate security, on migration, and on public safety. Unless the United States adopts a more proactive strategy, it will miss key windows of opportunity—and necessity—to build that architecture, even as Beijing pushes for a new security order aimed first and foremost at cementing long-term CCP control. © 2023 Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of Foreign Affairs. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency. Read the original article at Foreign Affairs.

Minst 35 döda i Kina – bil körde in i folkmassa

Minst 35 döda i Kina – bil körde in i folkmassa

Händelsen inträffade vid en sportarena vid åttatiden på måndagskvällen. Enligt flera medier ska bilen ha kört in i en folkmassa som utförde någon form av träningsaktivitet på arenan. – Den körde runt och runt och människor skadades på alla delar av löpbanan – öst, syd, väst och nord, säger ett annat vittne till det kinesiska nyhetsmagasinet Caixin. Bilder från platsen visade flera personer liggandes livlösa på marken efter att bilen kört runt. Många av de som skadats eller dödats är äldre, men det finns även barn bland offren. ”Extremt illvillig natur” Föraren, en man i 62-årsåldern, greps när han försökte fly platsen. Motivet bakom händelsen är ännu inte känt, men enligt ett utlåtande från den kinesiska polisen ska mannen ha varit missnöjd med en skilsmässouppgörelse. ”Poliser fann honom när han skadade sig själv med en kniv i bilen. De stoppade honom och körde honom till sjukhus för vård. På grund av allvarliga skador i nacken är han medvetslös och har ännu inte kunnat höras ”, skriver polisen i ett utlåtande. Den kinesiske presidenten Xi Jinping manar till största möjliga ansträngningar för att vårda de skadade. Han har också krävt att gärningsmannen ska straffas hårt, och beskriver brottet som en ”extremt illvillig natur”, enligt det statliga tv-bolaget CCTV. Censureras På tisdagen har sökningar i sociala medier om händelsen censurerats kraftigt och kinesiska mediers artiklar om händelser som publicerats på måndagskvällen har tagits bort. Hundratals invånare samlas regelbundet vid sportarenan i Zhuhai för att friidrotta, spela fotboll och umgås. Arenan har meddelat att den kommer att hålla stängt tills vidare.

Därför reste Orban till Georgien – trots anklagelser om valfusk

Därför reste Orban till Georgien – trots anklagelser om valfusk

I lördags gick Georgien till val i vad som benämnts som ett ödesval. Initialt såg det positivt ut för oppositionen, men när 99 procent av rösterna var räknade hade regeringspartiet Georgisk dröm fått över 50 procent av rösterna. En rysk påverkansoperation, menade den georgiska oppositionella presidenten Salome Zourabichvili som manade till massiva protester i Tbilisi. Även från svenskt håll kritiserades valet. – Vi har inte fått de slutliga rapporterna men allting talar för att det har skett många oegentligheter, att det är ett val som inte är pålitligt, att det har skett rent fusk på olika sätt, säger statsminister Ulf Kristersson till TT. Experten förutsåg Orbáns drag Efter valet fyllde demonstranter gatorna i Tbilisi. Oppositionella har vädjat om stöd från det internationella samfundet och EU och demonstranter fyllde gatorna i Tbilisi. Samtidigt anlände Viktor Orbán, premiärministern i Ungern som innehar ordförandeskapet i EU, till huvudstaden. Orbán gratulerade regeringen och beskrev valet som fritt och demokratiskt. Flera organisationer, bland annat OSSE, rapporterar att det förekommit valfusk. En som förutsåg Orbáns agerande redan i våras, i samband med att den ”utländska agent-lagen” klubbades igenom, är Daniel Hegedüs, regionalchef för Centraleuropa på tankesmedjan German Marshall Fund. I en artikel i EUobserver skrev han redan i maj om hur Ungern kunde komma att utnyttja det roterande ordförandeskapet för att legitimera valet för den georgiska regeringen – trots ouppklarade frågor om valfusk. – De skapar nära band till de som utmanar EU och väst. Länder som Ryssland och Kina, men även till mindre länder som Azerbaijan och i detta fallet Georgien, säger Daniel Hegedüs till TV4 Nyheterna. Kan komma att stoppa sanktioner De ungerska relationerna till de länder som vågar utmana EU kan sedan användas som en påtryckningsmetod mot EU, menar Daniel Hegedüs. Liknande metoder har använts i förhållande till Ukraina. – Jag tror vi kan förvänta oss att de kommer gå så långt att EU troligtvis inte kommer kunna införa sanktioner mot företrädare för Georgisk dröm, likt USA tidigare infört. Man kan förvänta sig att Ungern kommer motsätta sig sådana försök, säger Hegedüs. Ungern, som nu innehar ordförandeskapet, försöker främst utnyttja sin roll på två sätt, enligt Hegedüs. I början av ordförandeskapet försökte de öka sitt strategiska manöverutrymme och stärka sin utrikespolitiska självständighet. Då besökte Orbán bland annat Putin i Moskva och Xi Jinping i Peking. – Det andra är att störa EU:s utrikes- och institutionella politik. Det främjar den ungerska regimen men även ryska intressen, det är tydligt även i det georgiska valet, säger Hegedüs. Värderingsbaserad allians De två regeringspartierna Georgisk dröm och ungerska Fidesz har de senaste åren kommit allt närmare varandra. Georgiens premiärminister, Irakli Kobakhidze, beskrev besöket som ett ”bevis på den nära vänskapen mellan våra länder, byggd på delade värderingar”. – En allians har vuxit fram, främst baserad på gemensamma illiberala värderingar och intressen kopplade till inhemsk auktoritär utveckling säger Hegedüs. När EU valde att stoppa den georgiska processen för att ansluta sig till unionen i samband med att den ”utländska agent-lagen” klubbades igenom, fortsatte Ungern att stötta Georgien och dess beslut. – Det är uppenbart att de har en mycket nära relation, en som gör att premiärminister Orbán inte tvekar att gå i konflikt med EU, säger Hegedüs.

Elon Musk och Putin i hemliga samtal – ska ha pågått i flera år

Elon Musk och Putin i hemliga samtal – ska ha pågått i flera år

Samtalen mellan Musk och Putin, som varit igång sedan slutet av 2022, ska ha handlat om både personliga ämnen, affärer och geopolitiska spänningar, skriver The Wall Street Journal. Att miljardären och den ryska presidenten har samtalat flera gånger är något som flera före detta och nuvarande amerikanska, ryska och europeiska tjänstemän uppger för tidningen. Elon Musk är grundare av SpaceX som driver tjänsten Starlink. Företaget är Nasas och Pentagons primära raketuppskjutare. Det gör att Musk har viss tillgång till hemligstämplad information, och har starka band till amerikanska militären. Enligt två av källorna ska Putin ha bett Musk att inte aktivera sin Starlink-satellitinternettjänst över Taiwan, vilket var en tjänst till Kinas ledare Xi Jinping. Kreml: Har bara hänt en gång Elon Musk har inte kommenterat uppgifterna. Dmitry Peskov, talesperson för Kreml, bekräftar inte att det har skett några regelbundna samtal med Musk, men säger att ett samtal ägt rum en gång och då över telefon. Då ska Musk och Putin ha diskuterat ”rymden och nuvarande och framtida teknik”. Elon Musk sa i oktober 2022 att han haft ett samtal med Putin en gång i april 2021, ett samtal som ska ha handlat om rymden. ”De älskar det inte” Enligt källorna är samtalen mellan ryska presidenten och miljardären en väl bevarad hemlighet i den amerikanska regeringen. Flera som tidningen har pratat med visste inte om kontakten. En person som tidningen pratar med menar att det uppstår ett dilemma eftersom man förlitar sig på Musks rymdraketer. Samtidigt finns inga larm om säkerhetsintrång. – De älskar det inte, säger personen om var regeringen anser om kontakterna mellan Musk och Putin.

Utspelet: "Han vet att jag är galen"

Utspelet: "Han vet att jag är galen"

Det är extremt jämnt inför presidentvalet i USA som avgörs i början av november. Siffrorna varierar dag för dag. Ibland leder Republikanernas kandidat Donald Trump och ibland leder Demokraternas kandidat Kamala Harris. Om det skulle bli expresidenten Donald Trump som vinner valet så är han säker på en sak. Nämligen att Kina inte skulle våga provocera honom då ”Xi Jinping vet att jag är galen”, säger han i en intervju med The Wall Street Journal. – Jag hade en väldigt stark relation med honom. Han var faktiskt en riktigt god, jag vill inte säga vän, jag vill inte säga något dumt, men vi kom väldigt bra överens, säger Trump. Hotar med höga tullar I intervjun säger han också att han skulle införa tullar på mellan 150 och 200 procent mot Kina om de inför en blockad mot Taiwan. Trump får också frågan om amerikanska soldater skulle kunna sättas in i samband med det. – Jag skulle inte behöva det, eftersom han (Xi Jinping reds. anm.) respekterar mig och vet att jag är galen, säger han. Samtalen med Putin Donald Trump säger också att han och Vladimir Putin hade flera samtal under hans tid i Vita Huset och att han kom bra överens med den ryske presidenten. – Jag sa: ”Vladimir, om du ger dig på Ukraina kommer jag slå till mot dig så hårt att du inte kommer fatta vad som hände. Jag kommer slå till mot dig mitt i Moskva. Vi är vänner, jag vill inte göra det, men jag har inget alternativ”, säger han i intervjun.

Xi Jinping på YouTube

The rise of Xi Jinping, explained

How Xi Jinping became China's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong Help keep Vox free for everybody: ...

Vox på YouTube

Xi Jinping confronts Justin Trudeau at G20 over 'leaked' conversation details

China's president, Xi Jinping. confronted the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, at the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, ...

Guardian News på YouTube

History of Xi Jinping

Join my community at http://johncoogan.com (enter your email) SOURCES: This would have been impossible without this ...

John Coogan på YouTube

The world of China’s President Xi Jinping | DW Documentary

President Xi Jinping wants to establish the People's Republic of China as the leading world power of tomorrow. Never before has ...

DW Documentary på YouTube

How Xi Jinping Became China’s Leader for Life

Xi Jinping secured a historic third term as head of the Chinese Communist Party. Amid a punishing zero-Covid strategy, ...

VICE News på YouTube

Xi Jinping i poddar

Redder than red

Xi Jinping is born into the top rung of China's elite. But his family is torn apart while he is still a child. The Economist's Sue-Lin Wong finds out why Xi kept faith in the Communist revolution.Subscribe to The Economist with the best offer at economist.com/chinapod.

Hide and bide

As a modest provincial official in Fujian, Xi Jinping is outshone by his celebrity wife, while colleagues are caught up in a lurid corruption scandal. How does Xi survive? Subscribe to The Economist with the best offer at economist.com/chinapod.

Biden and Xi mend ties

A recent visit to the US by China’s president Xi Jinping has raised hopes of a bilateral rapprochement. But how stable is this more positive relationship and can a conflict over Taiwan be averted? Gideon discusses these questions with Washington-based China experts Evan Medeiros and Jude Blanchette. Clip: CNBCFree links to read more on this topic:America and a crumbling global orderMoody’s cuts China’s credit outlook to negativeUS, UK and Australia move to track ‘emerging threats’ in spaceEU must stand up for Taiwan at China summitSubscribe to The Rachman Review wherever you get your podcasts - please listen, rate and subscribe.Presented by Gideon Rachman. Produced by Fiona Symon. Sound design is by Breen TurnerRead a transcript of this episode on FT.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Two Superpowers Walk Into a Garden

One of the most highly anticipated diplomatic events of the year took place this week in a mansion outside San Francisco. President Biden and Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, met to repair their countries’ relations, which had sunk to one of their lowest points in decades.Edward Wong, a diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times, discusses the effort to bring the relationship back from the brink.Guest: Edward Wong, a diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times.Background reading: Both American and Chinese accounts of the meeting indicated scant progress on the issues that have pushed the two nations to the edge of conflict.China’s depiction of Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit reflected his sometimes-contradictory priorities: to project both strength and a willingness to engage with Washington.For more information on today’s episode, visit nytimes.com/thedaily. Transcripts of each episode will be made available by the next workday.

Introducing The Prince

Xi Jinping is the most powerful person in the world. But the real story of China’s leader remains a mystery. The Economist’s Sue-Lin Wong finds out how he rose to the top in a new podcast series launching on September 28th. For more China coverage, subscribe to The Economist and find a special offer at economist.com/chinapod.

January 3rd, 2024: Hamas Hit, Xi’s Rare Reveal, & Gay Gone

In this episode of The President's Daily Brief: We uncover the details of the Israeli military's strategic operation that neutralized a key Hamas figure, escalating tensions in the Middle East. We discuss President Xi Jinping's startling admission about China's economic struggles in his New Year's Eve speech, a first in his tenure. We recount the shocking assault on South Korean opposition leader Lee Jae-myung and his narrow escape from what could have been a fatal incident. Our coverage extends to America's southern border, where December saw an unprecedented surge in illegal migrant encounters, raising alarms on national security. And we conclude with the unfolding story of Harvard University President Claudine Gay, who resigns amid a scandal.   Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief. Email: PDB@TheFirstTV.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Chairman Mao Zedong vs. President Xi Jinping

The hosts unravel the lives and legacies of two Chinese dictators; Chairman Mao Zedong and current President of China Xi Jinping. They discuss Mao's involvement in the creation of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese civil war fighting the Nationalists, the world war fighting the Japanese, his brutality in taking control of China, the millions of deaths in his Great Leap Forward and the hysteria and horror of the Mao's Cultural Revolution. They also discuss President Xi Jinping's suffering under Mao, his ascension to the top of the CCP, the genocide of the Uyghur people, the attempted cover up of the coronavirus outbreak, his crackdown on Hong Kong and future plans for Taiwan. These two dictators battle it out in Round 19 of the knock-out tournament to determine the single greatest dictator of all time. One of these two dictators will be eliminated from the tournament and the other will remain in contention to be crowned history's biggest dictator.

Xi Jinping: The man behind the myth

This August, we're revisiting some of our favourite episodes from the past year.Xi Jinping is consolidating his position as the all-powerful president of China. But who is the man at the top of the sharpest pyramid in the world of politics?This podcast was brought to you thanks to the support of readers of The Times and The Sunday Times. Subscribe today and get one month free at: thetimes.co.uk/storiesofourtimes.Host: David Aaronovitch.Guest: Michael Sheridan, former foreign correspondent for The Sunday Times and author of The Gate to China: A New History of the People's Republic & Hong Kong.Clips: ABC, South China Morning Post, No Comment TV, BBC, CCTV Video News Agency, Periscope Film, Al Jazeera, CBS, VICE News. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Xi Jinping-Biden meeting to focus on US election concerns

Xi Jinping-Biden meeting to focus on US election concerns

How Xi Jinping did it

Just over a decade ago, President Xi Jinping was a virtual unknown. Few would say that now. In ten years, he’s reworked the Chinese Communist party, the military and the government so that he’s firmly in control. He’s also vanquished all of his obvious rivals. And now, he’s about to extend his time in office. Some say Xi might stay in the top job indefinitely. So how did Xi Jinping do it? Celia Hatton, the BBC’s Asia Pacific Editor, speaks to fellow China watchers to find out.Producer: Rob Walker Editor: Clare Fordham Researcher: Ben Cooper Studio Manager: James Beard Production Coordinators: Maria Ogundele and Helena Warwick-CrossWith special thanks to Kerry Allen.(Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the art performance celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China in 2021. Credit: Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

Cut The Clutter : Understanding Xi Jinping’s defence & military-industry ‘purge’, corruption & ‘self-revolution’

Chinese President Xi Jinping has been carrying out a purge within the corridors of power as part of his “crackdown” on the “cancer of corruption”. The latest officials netted in this drive, now in its second decade, include nine top generals and three leaders of state-owned military enterprises. In episoe 1377 of #CutTheClutter, Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta discusses Xi’s purge, what’s driving it, and how it plays into his larger strategic agenda. https://www.youtube.com/@CoorgWildernessResort More here - https://www.coorgwildernessresort.in