Svensk kvinna skjuten till döds i Kosovo

▸ En svensk kvinna sköts till döds i Kosovos huvudstad Pristina under tisdagskvällen.

Lovisa återförenades med sin pappa efter 18 år: "Jag har drömt om det"

Lovisa återförenades med sin pappa efter 18 år: "Jag har drömt om det"

Lovisa växte upp i 90-talets Dalarna. Hennes mamma hade inte möjlighet att ta hand om henne och hennes pappa visste hon inte mycket om. – Han bodde här innan jag föddes. Sen så fick han inte stanna här, så han for tillbaka till Kosovo där han är ifrån. Och sen så var han i Tyskland under kriget. Men trots att de befann sig i olika länder, kände pappan till att Lovisa fanns. De träffades när Lovisa var en liten bäbis, men därefter förlorade de kontakten. Och det skulle dröja lång tid innan de sågs igen. Lovisa växte upp utan att veta särskilt mycket om sin pappa. Hon bodde i olika fosterfamiljer och minns att hon kände sig ensam. – Jag hade flyttat runt mycket under väldigt kort tid. Det är en tid i livet där det är väldigt viktigt att man har det stabilt och tryggt. Så jag kände att jag var ensam och att ingen ville ha mig. Drömde om att få träffa sin pappa igen Men drömmen om att en dag få träffa sin pappa igen fanns alltid där. – Jag brukade sitta och titta på tv:n. Där rullade de namn från kriget, och då brukade jag sitta och kolla om jag kunde se hans namn där. Om han hade dött. Jag vet att när jag var åtta så kollade jag i telefonkatalogen och kollade efter Tahiri som är hans efternamn. Jag ringde upp någon random och bara, hej jag heter Lovisa. Jag letar efter min pappa. Trots att längtan fanns där, minns Lovisa att hon också bar på en otrygghet och en rädsla för det okända. När hon är tolv år får hon höra från Socialtjänsten att hennes pappa vill ha kontakt med henne igen, men då tackar Lovisa nej. – Men då var jag så rädd. När man är tolv, det är en lite känslig ålder. ”Plötsligt hade jag så mycket släkt” Men när hon fyller 18 väljer hon själv att begära ut alla sina journaler från Socialtjänsten. Efter att ha läst dem bestämmer hon sig för att hon måste ta reda på var hon kommer ifrån. Hon söker upp sin pappa på MSN och de börjar chatta och efter ett tag bestämmer sig Lovisa för att resa och hälsa på sin pappa. Där får hon reda på att hon har tre halvbröder. – Det var så knäppt. Jag har känt mig så jävla mycket ensam, och så plötsligt hade jag så mycket släkt. Alla har varit så himla fina och välkomnande. Och Lovisas pappa har också kommit för att besöka henne i Sverige. – Jag är så glad för det. Det har varit en dröm hela livet. Vissa kanske drömmer om hus, jag har drömt om att min pappa ska komma hit. Idag skapar Lovisa musik under artistnamnet Tahiri, som hon delar med sin pappa. – Jag tror inte att jag hade levt i dag om jag inte hade haft musiken, avslutar hon.

Levererade granater till Ukraina – trots starka banden till Ryssland

Levererade granater till Ukraina – trots starka banden till Ryssland

Ukraina har länge larmat om bristen på artilleriammunition och sökt all hjälp man kan få från sina västerländska partners. Då produktionen i Europa inte kunnat möta efterfrågan introducerade Tjeckiens presidenten Petr Pavel i våras ett initiativ för att köpa hundratusentals artillerigranater tillsammans med andra partners från väst, för att sedan skänka till Ukraina. Säljaren har varit hemlig Initialt lokaliserades 800 000 granater och bland annat Sverige anslöt och valde att bidra med 336 miljoner kronor. Tjeckernas jakt på granater fortsatte och senare kom beskedet att man hittat 700 000 granater till. Varifrån alla granater kom har dock inte avslöjats. Det har tidigare spekulerats om att de skulle ha köpts från Turkiet, Sydafrika eller Sydkorea. ”Av säkerhetsskäl kan vi inte kommentera vilka länder som kommer delta i inköpet av ammunitionen. Vi kan inte heller berätta var ammunitionen ska köpas ifrån”, skrev det tjeckiska försvarsministeriet till TV4 Nyheterna i samband med att initiativet presenterades. Vucic: ”Det är våra slaviska bröder” I en intervju med Financial Times berättar den serbiske presidenten, Aleksandar Vucic att landet har sålt artillerigranater till ett värde av 800 miljoner euro sedan 2022, som via andra länder hamnat i Ukraina. Vucic säger att de inte kan exportera till Ukraina eller Ryssland, men att man bland annat gjort affärer med Tjeckien, Spanien, USA och flera andra. Serbien och Kreml har länge stått varandra nära. Tillsammans med Belarus är Serbien det enda europeiska landet som inte infört sanktioner mot Ryssland. Från ryskt håll har man stöttat Serbien i motståndet mot Kosovos självständighet, lånat ut pengar samt bistått med vapenleveranser. Trots det har serbiska granater hamnat hos det ukrainska försvaret. – Jag behöver ta hand om mitt folk, det är allt jag kan säga. Vi har vänner i Kiev och Moskva. De är våra slaviska bröder, säger Vucic. Experten: Uppenbart att han inte vill erkänna President Vucic beskriver försäljningen som en del av Serbiens ”ekonomiska återupplivning” och att han inte har något ansvar för var ammunition som de säljer hamnar. Ivan Vejvoda, tidigare rådgivare åt den serbiska regeringen och som idag arbetar på Institutet för humanvetenskap i Wien menar att Vucic inte vill skylta med den hjälp Ukraina fått från serbiskt håll. – Han pratar luddigt om detta. Det är uppenbart att han inte vill erkänna detta och vill hålla extremhögern glad. Samtidigt har Serbien faktiskt gett en massiv hjälp till Ukraina, säger Ivan Vejvoda till Financial Times.

Michael Claesson blir Sveriges nya ÖB

Michael Claesson blir Sveriges nya ÖB

– Michael Claesson är en mycket meriterad blivande ÖB, säger Ulf Kristersson (M). Michael Claesson är generallöjtnant och chef för försvarsstaben samt förbandschef för högkvarteret sedan januari i fjol. Han har varit militär rådgivare på försvarsdepartementet och rådgivare på utrikesdepartementet. Han har också tjänstgjort i Kosovo och Afghanistan och varit rådgivare vid Sveriges delegation i Nato. – Med sin bakgrund inom försvarsmakten, regeringskansliet och i Nato har han inte bara bredden och djupet i erfarenhet och kunskap som behövs, han har också ett mycket stort internationellt och nationellt kontaktnät, säger försvarsminister Pål Jonsson (M). Michael Claesson blir ÖB den 1 oktober när den tidigare, Micael Bydén, går i pension efter nio år på posten. Under pressträffen pratar den blivande överbefälhavaren om att Rysslands krigföring och ”icke-linjär verksamhet”, hybrida hot, är det största hotet mot Sverige just nu.

Offren sköts med en revolver – polisen: Har en uppfattning om motivet

Offren sköts med en revolver – polisen: Har en uppfattning om motivet

Skolskjutningen inträffade klockan 09.08 under tisdagsmorgonen. En timme senare meddelade polisen att man gripit den tolvåriga misstänkta skytten. Under lugna former greps han i stadsdelen Siltamäki i Helsingfors. – I denna sorgliga situation gick det inte att förhindra dådet. Vad som är orsaken får vi utreda senare, sade polischefen Seppo Kolehmainen på en presskonferens under tisdagen. Polisen: Har en uppfattning av motivet I ett pressmeddelande meddelade den finska polisen under onsdagen att man håller på att undersöka motivet till skjutningen. Under gårdagen ville polisen inte kommentera om offren valts ut slumpmässigt eller om gärningsmannen hade planerat att skada dem. Polisen skriver att de nu har en preliminär uppfattning om motivet bakom dådet, men av utredningsskäl vill man inte gå in på några detaljer i nuläget. – Det är många förhör med vittnen och skolelever kvar, vi vill inte sätta några ord i munnen på dem, säger kriminalkommissarie Leif Malmberg. Polisen bekräftar också att det vapen som hittades på den misstänkte när han greps är en pistol. Enligt polisen ska vapnet ha tillhört en släktning till den misstänkte. Hur pojken fick tag i vapnet vet man inte just nu. – Det är något som utreds, men det är en revolver som en nära släkting är ägare till. Vi har kunnat säkerställa att det är det vapnet som har använts, säger Leif Malmberg. De skadade sköts med revolvern I förhör har även tolvåringen erkänt att det var han som genomförde dådet. Polisens arbete fortsätter nu i form av att förhöra vittnet och genomföra en teknisk utredning. – Sen spanar vi på sociala medier också, om där finns något som kan förklara eller styrka misstanken till motivet, säger Leif Malmberg. Polisen bekräftar även att det barn som dog var en pojke. De två som skadats är flickor, deras skadeläge beskrivs som allvarligt. – De är mycket allvarligt skadade, de har blivit skjutna och träffats av skott från revolvern, säger kriminalkommissarie Leif Malmberg. En av flickorna har dubbelt medborgarskap i Finland och i Kosovo. Kosovos ambassad skriver på sociala medier att de har varit i kontakt med den skadade flickans familj och har erbjudit dem hjälp.

Svensk kvinna mördad i Kosovo

Kvinnan ska ha färdats i en bil tillsammans med sin familj när de utsattes för ett rån i huvudstaden. Enligt lokala medier krävdes familjer på värdesaker innan kvinnan sköts till döds Utrikesdepartementet bekräftar att kvinnan, som är i 30-årsåldern, dött under onsdagen. ”Med hänvisning till konsulär sekretess har vi inte någon ytterligare information att lämna om det enskilda fallet”, skriver UD i ett mejl till TT. Kvinnans anhöriga är underrättade. Ingen är gripen misstänkt för mordet.

Om Israel lyckas krossa Hamas – vad kommer då efter?

Om Israel lyckas krossa Hamas – vad kommer då efter?

De israeliska styrkorna står troligen inför en svår och utdragen strid mot Hamas. Resultatet kommer att bli blodigt och debatten om ifall det mänskliga lidandet var värt det kommer fortsätta efter kriget. Men – om det skulle lyckas – finns ett unikt tillfälle att åstadkomma en bättre situation i Gaza, skriver Steven Simon, tidigare rådgivare för Mellanösternfrågor i Vita huset, i Foreign Affairs. Israels egna efterkrigsplan tycks bestå av hård blockad mot Gaza med återkommande lufträder. Troligen skulle kontrollen över Gaza falla i händerna på krigsherrar eller någon organisation som axlar Hamas mantel, resonerar Simon. Han argumenterar för att både Israel och palestinierna på Gaza skulle tjäna på att överlämna ansvaret till en tredje part och skissar en plan där USA skulle leda en grupp med representanter från Israel, Egypten, Jordanien, Saudiarabien, EU, FN och Palestinska myndigheten. Dessa skulle se till att kontrollen över Gaza överlämnades i ordnade former från Israel till FN med hjälp av en resolution från säkerhetsrådet, likt den som användes i Kosovo. A Plan to Return the Gaza Strip to Palestinians and Keep Israel Safe By Steven Simon 18 October, 2023 Israel’s offensive against the Gaza Strip is ramping up. After the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas spilled out of Gaza to stage a brutal attack on Israel on October 7, the enclave is now under siege. Israel has cut off the delivery of electricity, water, fuel, and food. Israeli warnings have led hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza to flee their homes, and Israeli bombs have killed thousands already. And all this ahead of a much-anticipated ground invasion that will likely lead to significant casualties on both sides. Some analysts, such as Marc Lynch in Foreign Affairs and Hussein Ibish in The New York Times, have argued that “invading Gaza will be a disaster” and that Israel “will be walking into a trap.” They could well be right. Military operations in urban terrain are notoriously difficult and deadly. And Hamas, as a social movement and not just a militant outfit, will be impossible to fully uproot. But Israel may yet achieve its maximalist war aim of destroying Hamas’s leadership and military capacity. The Israel Defense Forces has now deployed 350,000 reservists and 170,000 active-duty personnel. Although the bulk of these forces will be allocated to the northern front facing Lebanon and the militant group Hezbollah, there will be plenty of soldiers left for operations in Gaza. Meanwhile, Hamas can deploy at best 15,000 fighters. The IDF has complete control over Gaza’s airspace, coastline, and land border. In order to smash Hamas, the Israeli public is prepared to tolerate high casualties in addition to the significant losses it has already incurred. And Israel has the support of essential outside players, not least the United States. It is hard to envisage more favorable conditions for the difficult campaign Israel is contemplating. This raises a major question: what happens if Israel does manage to defeat Hamas? Although the Biden administration views a ground offensive and the blockade of Gaza as a risk to regional stability—and worries about an unfolding humanitarian disaster—the United States’ ability to alter Israel’s course at this point is limited. Israel might have narrowed its own options if it is shown to be responsible for the October 17 bombing of Al Ahli Arab hospital in northern Gaza that killed hundreds. But if the planned Israeli assault is a fait accompli, the United States and its partners must start to think carefully about a range of scenarios, including a Gaza without Hamas. The incapacitation of the militant group will be bloody, but Hamas’s removal could provide a fleeting opportunity to bring about a new dispensation in Gaza that is better than what came before it. Whether it will have been worth the human suffering will be debated after the war. But if Israel defeats Hamas, the United States should work with regional and international powers to find a way to transfer Israeli control of Gaza to the temporary stewardship of the United Nations, backed by the strong mandate of a UN Security Council resolution. This UN mission would then help return Gaza to Palestinian control. Unless the ultimate objective is revival of the Palestinian Authority and its control of Gaza, Arab countries will be reluctant to participate in such a day-after plan. It will still be a hard sell in Israel, where distrust of the UN runs deep. But such a process would not just spare Palestinians in Gaza the prospect of an indefinite Israeli occupation and repeated rounds of destructive skirmishes—or even wars—with Israel, it would also, by restoring Palestinian Authority administration in Gaza, preserve the possibility of a two-state solution that now appears so unattainable. The opportunity to establish a better arrangement in Gaza would in large part be a function of the defeat of Hamas. But other developments may make such an outcome more likely. Israel is now ruled by a new emergency coalition government that includes centrists, who in the past have endorsed a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and feature two former IDF chiefs of staff, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot. The Israeli war cabinet reflects a diversity of views that can help serve as a counterweight to the extreme right, which moved to the foreground of Israeli politics after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formed a new government late last year. The Biden administration’s new eagerness to reassert a U.S. role in the Middle East—beyond its fitful attempts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program—will also help. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in particular, wants to demonstrate the utility of diplomacy as an instrument of policy and the current crisis is tailor-made for this goal. He is currently shuttling among regional capitals. Although the war in Gaza has scotched the mooted normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia as facilitated by the United States, the negotiating process has opened lines of communication that make the coordination of policies among the three countries regarding the future of Gaza a real possibility. Israeli forces now face a potentially long and grinding campaign in the territory. The outcome of this campaign remains uncertain. Hamas fighters know this dense urban landscape, riddled with tunnels and potential booby traps, better than their IDF opponents. External forces, including Iran and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, may launch attacks on Israel in the hope of complicating any Israeli advance in Gaza. But the preponderance of strength remains with Israel. Buoyed by the support of its superpower backer, the United States, Israel may well succeed in its goal of flushing out Hamas’s leadership and destroying the group’s ability to rule Gaza. Much will then depend on who controls the ground after Israel withdraws. Israel’s answer to this question is not clear. Its postwar plan seems to involve a tight blockade of Gaza that sharply restricts imports, rigid controls on the movement of people across the boundary between Israel and Gaza, and a system of opportunistic raids and airstrikes launched from Israel on targets within Gaza when deemed necessary by emerging intelligence information. Control of Gaza would presumably devolve to warlords or a Hamas successor organization that can rule over the rubble but be unable to kill Israelis. Such an arrangement may not prove especially durable. After all, Hamas acquired an arsenal and constructed a sprawling network of tunnels despite stringent Israeli controls and the close surveillance of Gaza. It is hard—perhaps impossible—to seal off Gaza in a long-term, impermeable way. Israel would make itself a jail warden, presiding indefinitely over an immense prison camp (to which Gaza has long been compared). For Israel, and for the Palestinians in Gaza, handing off control to a third party would be the better course of action. Otherwise, the situation will eventually revert to a grimmer version of the status quo ante, only with many more people dead on both sides and Gaza’s vital infrastructure pulverized. There is at least one alternative to this bleak forecast. The United States could lead a contact group, a clutch of neighboring states and selected outside powers, namely Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the UN, and the Palestinian Authority. The group would develop a plan to transfer control of Gaza from Israel to the UN once combat operations have ceased. This would be an enormous undertaking for the UN, whose institutional capacity is already strained, encumbered by a rigid and complicated bureaucracy. Setting these defects aside, the key step at this stage would be the securing of a UN mandate in the form of a Security Council resolution authorizing member states to organize a transitional administration for Gaza, maintain civil order and public services in coordination with Israel, and develop a plan for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. China and Russia, veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, may stymie such a resolution. But ensuring that the request for a mission came from, say, Egypt and was endorsed by the Palestinian Authority (an observer state at the UN) might make it easier for China and Russia to abstain in a Security Council vote or even support the endeavor. There are precedents: a 1999 Security Council resolution placed Kosovo under temporary UN administration, mandating two entities—the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, which served as a transitional administration, and the Kosovo Force, which was a NATO force carrying out the instructions of the Security Council. Moreover, a UN mandate does not dictate the requirement for a UN mission. Here, the precedent of a 2023 Security Council resolution authorizing a Kenyan peacekeeping force in Haiti permits a non-UN mission to draw, on a reimbursable basis, from UN supply stocks. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe had such an authority for its monitoring mission in Ukraine from 2014 to 2022 and the African Union for its forces in Somalia from 2007 to 2022. This procedure gives the organizers of the mission, such as the contact group, free rein to build the best team possible. And because the mission may not be a UN one, skeptical Israelis may be reassured of its utility. If the Security Council were to approve a resolution that mandates a transitional arrangement in Gaza, the subsequent mission would have to be appropriately sized, structured, and defined. Since time would be of the essence, the contact group, in coordination with UN agencies, would have to identify and recruit donor states, and equip and deploy the peacekeeping and “protection of civilians” units. Essential equipment, such as vehicles and computers, would be drawn from UN stocks. The mission’s rules of engagement would have to permit firing in self-defense, and the peacekeepers’ primary function would be policing. The force itself would have to comprise troops from Arab states, in part to minimize language barriers but also to reinforce the notion that the mission is led by Arabs. Applying the rule of thumb of five peacekeepers per 1,000 civilians, the force would have to be sizable, upwards of 10,000 troops or more. The UN mission headquarters would liaise with Israeli authorities, UN headquarters, and the contact group. The interim UN-backed administration would bear some resemblance to the UN governance mission in Kosovo, where the UN has managed relative success in a fragile environment, and to the UN mission in Libya, where it backs one of two rival governments. There is no shortage of UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations capable of organizing elections. With the election of a new president and a new Palestinian legislative body, the UN mission would shift from its Kosovo-like role to one more like the UN mission in Libya, where the international organization supports an elected government. The UN mission would require a powerful head, someone capable of standing up to both Israelis and Palestinians who could deal with senior officials from outside powers—somebody like Sigrid Kaag, the deputy prime minister of the Netherlands, who previously served as a high-ranking UN official and envoy in Syria and Lebanon. The political aim here would be to revive a moribund Palestinian Authority that lost its authority over Gaza in 2006, the last time elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council were held. The current president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, was last elected in 2005. Despite the suspicion and doubt with which many Palestinians regard Abbas and the PA, Arab states will not cooperate with any attempt to reset the administration of Gaza without a role for the body. Nor will the major powers of the global South—with the possible exception of India, which has grown closer to Israel in recent years—approve of such a plan if control of the territory did not return in some form to Palestinians. Indeed, many Arab states as well as those in the global South might demand more than elections and the reassertion of PA control over the territory; they might demand that Israel make territorial concessions and halt settlement construction in the West Bank. Without securing gains on the ground, a restored PA in Gaza will lack credibility and appear like a mere puppet regime. Israel may balk at the prospect of making such concessions, but the centrist members of the unity government might help tip the balance. None of these measures will matter without swift action to rebuild a devastated Gaza. This is where Saudi Arabia becomes critical to the success of the transfer of Gaza from Israeli control to the UN and the subsequent consolidation of the Palestinian Authority’s hold over both the West Bank and Gaza. The cost of reconstruction will be substantial. Public infrastructure—including hospitals, schools, roads, electrical substations, water pipes, sanitation systems, and government offices—will probably be in ruins. To clear the rubble alone will take time and money. The United States will certainly try to be a generous contributor and, with Israeli cooperation and a functioning House of Representatives, Congress will appropriate the necessary funds. Saudi Arabia, however, not only has the funds to make a difference, but its participation will also lend the enterprise the kind of regional legitimacy that will strengthen the Palestinian Authority. Many hurdles stand in the way of such an arrangement coming to pass. China and Russia may choose to obstruct the passing of the necessary resolution at the Security Council. Arab states may be unwilling to join what many of their citizens see as an occupying force in the strip. And Israel may refuse to make concessions to the Palestinians in the wake of Hamas’s attacks and an Israeli military victory. But one purpose of diplomacy is to probe intentions and spur the consideration of a wider range of options in a contingency. This is what the moment requires. The alternative is Gaza as an eternal dystopia, with violence metastasizing around the broader region, and states less able to deal with all manner of social and environmental disarray—in other words, a Middle East transformed, but not quite as Washington envisaged it. © 2023 Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of Foreign Affairs. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency. Read the original article at Foreign Affairs.

Azerbajdzjan bojkottar EU-ledarnas möte i Granada

Azerbajdzjan bojkottar EU-ledarnas möte i Granada

Migrationen, det spända läget mellan Serbien och Kosovo, oroligheterna i Nagorno-Karabach och Rysslands krig mot Ukraina. Det är några av de tyngsta frågorna när EU-ledarna möts i Granada i Spanien i dag. Enligt Al Jazeera finns det förhoppningar om att ledarna för Serbien och Kosovo ska kunna komma överens om att hålla samtal efter den senaste tidens eskalering vid gränsen. EU-ledarna hade även hoppats att Azerbajdzjans president Ilham Aliyev och Armeniens premiärminister Nikol Pashinyan skulle mötas öga mot öga på mötet. Men Aliyev uteblir efter att ha ilsknat till mot vad han anser är partiskhet till förmån för Armenien från franskt och tyskt håll. En annan som inte dyker upp är Turkiets president Erdogan.

Kosovo på YouTube

We need to talk about Kosovo

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14 Most Beautiful Places to Explore in Kosovo | Travel Video | SKY Travel

14 Most Beautiful Places to Explore in Kosovo | Travel Video | SKY Travel 01.Pristina 02.Gracanica Monastery 03.Kosovo ...

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Pristina, Kosovo🇽🇰 #2hoinari #pristina #kosovo

Pristina, Kosovo #2hoinari #pristina #kosovo.

2 Hoinari på YouTube

Serbia vs Kosovo military power comparison 2024 | Kosovo vs Serbia military power 2024

Serbia vs Kosovo military power comparison 2024 | Kosovo vs Serbia military power 2024 Hello friends, in this video I have ...

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Kosovo i poddar

35. Cathy Ashton: Dealing with Putin and Lavrov, Kosovo–Serbia, and 'radical humility'

How do we retain empathy when negotiating with a stranger who has a radically different worldview to our own? As the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, Cathy Ashton worked with many world leaders: Vladimir Putin in Russia, Serbia's Ivica Dacic, Kosovo's Hashim Thaci, and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Former Leader of the House of Lords, Cathy Ashton has also been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for her diplomacy. Listen to hear Rory and Alastair discuss her life, the European Union, conflicts abroad, and why empathy is so important in foreign affairs.  TRIP Plus: Become a member of The Rest Is Politics Plus to support the podcast, enjoy ad-free listening to both TRIP and Leading, benefit from discount book prices on titles mentioned on the pod, join our Discord chatroom, and receive early access to live show tickets and Question Time episodes. Just head to therestispolitics.com to sign up, or start a free trial today on Apple Podcasts: apple.co/therestispolitics. Instagram: @restispolitics Twitter: @RestIsPolitics Email: restispolitics@gmail.com Producers: Dom Johnson + Nicole Maslen Exec Producers: Tony Pastor + Jack Davenport Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Kosovo War

The war in Ukraine has left many of us aghast that open armed conflict could again erupt on the European continent... except the idea of a peaceful post-WW2 Europe is hardly historically correct.The Kosovo War of 1999 is but one example. Over 78 days NATO aircraft bombarded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's forces into submission, achieving a swift victory without a single ground troop having to be deployed.The conflict has been described as Tony Blair's 'Perfect War', but is this accurate? In this episode James is joined by author and former UK diplomat Arthur Snell to find out.Arthur's new book How Britain Broke the World is available here.This episode was edited by Aidan Lonergan.For more Warfare content, subscribe to our Warfare Wednesday newsletter here. If you'd like to learn even more, we have hundreds of history documentaries, ad free podcasts and audiobooks at History Hit - subscribe today! To download, go to Android or Apple store.

86. Politics in football, Trump under pressure, and Kosovo

Join Rory and Alastair as they discuss the end of the World Cup and the soft power that comes with it, rising tensions between Kosovo and Serbia, Rory's experiences as Prisons Minister, and the challenge the government faces regarding prison reform. TRIP Plus: Become a member of The Rest Is Politics Plus to support the podcast, enjoy ad-free listening, and receive early access to live show tickets and Question Time episodes. Just head to therestispolitics.com to sign up. Instagram: @restispolitics Twitter: @RestIsPolitics Email: restispolitics@gmail.com Producers: Dom Johnson + Nicole Maslen Exec Producers: Tony Pastor + Jack Davenport Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Kosovo–Serbia relations

After unilaterally declaring independence in 2008, Kosovo has been recognised by many countries, but not Serbia, which still claims it as one of its provinces. After the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Serbia cracked down on Kosovo separatists, resulting in a NATO military intervention in 1999. Tensions have remained high and have begun to flare up again in recent years.The majority Albanian population mostly supports independence, but in the northern areas of Kosovo, Serbs are the majority, and many refuse to recognise Kosovan institutions. BBC Serbian reporter Aleksandar Miladinović explains these divisions, and considers if relations between the two countries can ever be normalised.

Kosovo med Steinar Bryn (094)

Et av verdens nyeste land fikk aldri noe lett start på grunn av store motsetninger mellom ulike folkegrupper. Men det har Sverre Bryn og Nansenskolen gjort noe med. Han har besøkt Kosovo mange ganger og hatt over 3000 besøkende fra tidligere Jugoslavia hjemme på Lillehammer. Det er knapt nødvendig å si at han kjenner Kosovo svært godt og har en bråte spennende historier.  Episoden kan inneholde målrettet reklame, basert på din IP-adresse, enhet og posisjon. Se smartpod.no/personvern for informasjon og dine valg om deling av data.

Why have tensions flared in Kosovo?

NATO reinforcements started arriving in Kosovo this week, following violent clashes in majority-Serb north Kosovo in late May. Outbreaks of violence erupted following disputed local elections, which Kosovo Serbs boycotted, allowing ethnic Albanians to take control of councils in northern Kosovo. The unrest comes after an apparent breakthrough in March when Kosovo and Serbia agreed to an EU-backed plan aimed at normalising ties. On the Real Story this week we’ll ask whether the latest crisis endangers those negotiations, and what needs to happen to defuse tensions in both the short and long-term. How do people living and working in North Kosovo deal with the complex issues of ethnic identity that have shaped the region for decades? What is the role of outside players like the United States and European Union? And how has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the West’s approach to the Balkans?Shaun Ley is joined by:Misha Glenny, Rector of the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna and a former BBC Central Europe Correspondent. Dr Gezim Visoka, Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City UniversityDr Helena Ivanov, visiting fellow in the international relations department at the LSE and an Associate Research Fellow with The Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank that advocates the spread of liberal democracy.Also featuring: Albin Kurti, Prime Minister of Kosovo Nemanja Starović, State Secretary, Serbia’s Ministry of Defence Jovana Radosavljevic, Executive Director at the New Social Initiative, a civil society organization based in North Mitrovica Guy Delauney, the BBC’s Balkans CorrespondentImage: Members of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) stand guard in Zvecan, Kosovo, May 31, 2023. REUTERS/Ognen TeofilovskiProduced by Imogen Wallace and Rozita Riazati

22 - The Geopolitics of Kosovo

Kosovo has spent the last 2 decades fighting for its own independence, but with ever-increasing obstacles standing in their way will this mountainous nation ever achieve its lifelong dream?  This week we take a look into the Western Balkans, Serbia's geopolitical aspirations, as well as Moscow's re-entry into an area it once viewed as its own backyard; and what it means for the future of the Kosovan people.  On this episode Marija Ristic (Balkan Insight) Bodo Weber (Democratization Policy Council) Vessela Tcherneva (European Council on Foreign Relations) More info at www.theredlinepodcast.com Follow the show on @TheRedLinePod Or Michael on @MikeHilliardAus  

Cathy Ashton: Dealing with Putin and Lavrov, Kosovo–Serbia, and 'radical humility'

How do we retain empathy when negotiating with a stranger who has a radically different worldview to our own?  As the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, Cathy Ashton worked with many world leaders: Vladimir Putin in Russia, Serbia's Ivica Dacic, Kosovo's Hashim Thaci, and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.  Former Leader of the House of Lords, Cathy Ashton has also been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for her diplomacy. Listen to hear Rory and Alastair discuss her life, the European Union, conflicts abroad, and why empathy is so important in foreign affairs. 

Balkan Border Wars - Serbia and Kosovo

Old enemies Serbia and Kosovo discuss what for some is unthinkable - an ethnic land swap. This dramatic proposal is one of those being talked about as a means of normalising relations between these former foes. Since the bloody Kosovo war ended with NATO intervention in 1999, civility between Belgrade and Pristina has been in short supply. Redrawing borders along ethnic lines is anathema to many, but politicians in Serbia and Kosovo have their eyes on a bigger prize... For Serbia, that is membership of the European Union. But the EU will not accept Serbia until it makes an accommodation with its neighbour. Kosovo wants to join the EU too, but its immediate priority is recognition at the United Nations, and that is unlikely while Serbia's ally, Russia, continues to thwart Kosovo's ambitions there. Both of these Balkan nations want to exit this impasse. And a land-swap, giving each of them much-coveted territory, might just do it. For Crossing Continents, Linda Pressly and producer, Albana Kasapi, visit the two regions at the heart of the proposal - the ethnically Albanian-majority Presevo Valley in Serbia, and the mostly Serb region north of Mitrovica in Kosovo.(PHOTO: Hevzi Imeri, an ethnic Albanian and Danilo Dabetic, a Serb, play together at the basketball club Play 017 in Bujanovac – one of very few mixed activities for young people in Serbia’s Presevo Valley. BBC photo.)

The untold story of NATO's role in independent Kosovo with Ade Clewlow

"Only a week earlier I’d been pushing my daughter on a swing in England, within a few days I was also already playing my part in shaping the Balkans’ newest independent country.” In this podcast Ade Clewlow MBE, former British Army Officer and alumnus of the Defence Studies Department at King’s discusses his new book ‘Under a Feathered Sky’, a unique, first-hand account of his work on the ground supporting NATO in 2009 during one of the most profound periods of change in Kosovo’s turbulent history. We’ll discuss the volatile security context, clash of cultures, balancing family life with being on deployment, doing shots of raki in the morning ‘for Queen and country’, and the past, present and future of Kosovo’s Independence.

7. Elona Kurti on Politics in Kosovo

This week I'm joined by Elona Kurti to discuss the politics of her home country, Kosovo. We talk about Kosovo's position during the breakdown of Yugoslavia, the effects of NATO's intervention in the Kosovo war, and present day tensions. The documentary I recommend midway through can be found here :)